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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effectiveness and Adoption of Market-Based State Health Care Expansion 
Programs 
 
By 
Nathan Myers 
Dr. Chris Stream, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Public Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
    Market-based state health expansion programs are alternatives to government 
programs like Medicaid and SCHIP which also seek to expand access to health insurance 
for uninsured populations. These programs either utilize the private health insurance 
market or function according to market principles. The market-based policies at issue in 
this research are state high-risk health insurance pools, limited benefit plans, group 
purchasing arrangements, reinsurance programs, and Health Insurance Flexibility and 
Accountability waivers. This research addresses two separate but related research 
questions: 1) Do these market-based programs provide general economic and social 
benefits for the citizens of a state? 2) What role does citizen ideology and partisanship 
play in the adoption of market-based programs at the state level?  
    This research indicates that the implementation of market-based programs at the state 
level, as measured by an additive index, do provide some general benefits to the people 
of a state. Regression analyses with panel-corrected standard errors and a Prais-Winsten 
transformation indicate that market-based programs help to reduce mortalities per capita 
and emergency outpatients treated. There is also evidence that these market-based 
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programs are successful in helping to increase the gross state product. Separate analyses 
focused on the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools indicate that these 
programs individually also provide general benefits.  
    Looking at the second research question regarding the influence of ideology and 
partisanship on the adoption of market-based programs, the results are mixed. The Cox 
proportional regression analysis found that having a higher percentage of Democrats in 
the state legislature contributes to the adoption of market-based health insurance 
expansion programs, while a higher level of citizen liberalism reduces the probability of 
market-based programs being adopted. This suggests that a more liberal citizen 
population is more supportive of government-based programs, but Democratic legislators 
will nevertheless support the adoption of market-based programs as they require the 
expenditure of limited financial and political capital but still allow the Democrats to 
claim credit for advancing access to health care. Anecdotal examples of this could be 
seen in the 2009 debate over the Obama health care plan.  
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
     While the issue of universal health care reform largely faded from the national 
political agenda following the failure of the Clinton health reforms in the 1990’s, the 
issue once again became prominent during the 2008 presidential election campaign. 
Democratic Senator and presidential nominee Barack Obama proposed a comprehensive, 
government-based program (Barack Obama campaign web site, 2008), while his 
Republican rival, Senator John McCain, argued for a more market-based approach (John 
McCain campaign web site, 2008). However, between the years of 1994 and 2008 the 
issue of health care hardly remained static, especially at the sub-national level. During 
this period, states took the lead in the area of health care reform, largely through 
incremental programs targeted toward particular segments of the uninsured population 
(Patel and Rushefsky, 1999). For states, the focus was on market-based programs which 
included high-risk health insurance pools, reinsurance plans, limited benefit plans, group 
purchasing arrangements, and Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers 
(State Coverage Initiatives, 2009). Of particular interest in this study are state high-risk 
health insurance pools -- which are market-based, state-created non-profit organizations 
principally created to provide insurance coverage to those deemed uninsurable by private 
companies. This dissertation discusses two complementary but related studies involving 
the effectiveness and adoption of market-based state health expansion programs, with 
particular emphasis on state high-risk health insurance pools. The recent experience of 
the State of Tennessee in trying to enact both government-based and market-based health 
access expansion programs is a good illustration of these issues. 
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State-based and Market-based Health Reform in Tennessee 
     While the Clinton administration’s attempt at enacting universal health care failed in 
Congress, it did yield some new government-based and market-based programs. One 
example was in the state of Tennessee, where the government-based TennCare program 
was created in 1994. The governor at that time, Democrat Ned McWhirter, was seeking a 
strategy to get Medicaid spending under control after the state experienced a $250 million 
shortfall. Confronted with a difficult choice between a major tax increase or spending 
cuts, McWhirter put forth the TennCare program. This program sought to cover hundreds 
of thousands of uninsured Tennesseans, purportedly for the same cost as what the state 
was already spending on Medicaid (Wright, 2001).  
     For a time, the TennCare program appeared to be succeeding in its goals. However, 
the cost of the program grew, and by 2005, Tennessee’s Medicaid expenditures, 
including TennCare, represented over 26% of the state’s spending, while at the same time 
new enrollment in the TennCare Standard program was closed except for children under 
19 (Bureau of TennCare, 2004-5). In 2002, these difficulties in the program led Phil 
Bredesen, the newly elected Tennessee governor (About Phil, n.d.), to begin to pursue 
strategies for reforming the program in order to save money and limit benefits. Bredesen 
first promised to find a durable strategy for preserving TennCare, but eventually 
presented, before a joint session of the Tennessee legislature, a market-based alternative 
to the TennCare program called Cover Tennessee. The Cover Tennessee program is 
actually composed of three different programs: CoverTN, CoverKids, and AccessTN. 
The CoverTN program represents a cost-sharing program where employers, employees, 
and the state each contribute to the purchasing of employee health insurance. The 
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CoverKids program provides insurance to uninsured children in families of four making 
up to $50,000 a year, although higher income families can buy into the program. The 
third element of AccessTN is a high-risk pool, which provides health insurance at a 
premium for those who have been denied coverage due to a preexisting condition 
(Bredesen Unveils, March 27, 2006).  
     Cover Tennessee was enacted by the legislature in May 2006, with a vote of 78-19 in 
the House, and 30-1 in the Senate (Seibert, May 18, 2006). A deal was made in 
November 2006 to reserve 4,500 of 6,000 slots in the new AccessTN risk pool for 
chronically ill people cut from the rolls of the TennCare program (Medical News Today, 
November 21, 2006). Meanwhile, as of October 2007, TennCare was given permission 
by federal authorities to continue operating in much a pared-down form for three years 
(Chang, 2007).   
     In 2008, a year after the Cover Tennessee program began offering coverage, the 
employer-provided coverage element, CoverTN, was found to be missing its enrollment 
targets by about 20%. Some Tennessee legislators took the opportunity of this 
announcement to attack the program, being particularly critical of the maximum $25,000 
a year payout. Health care advocates also attacked the CoverTN program, calling it a 
“defined benefit plan that has serious limits.” Meanwhile polling done by the National 
Federation of Small Business found that 60% of small business supported it (Rodgers, 
June 15, 2008). However, the long-term efficacy of the program has yet to be determined, 
particularly in regard to general social and economic benefits.  The example of 
Tennessee’s experience with the TennCare and Cover Tennessee programs sets up the 
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two questions at the center of this dissertation, both of which are primarily applicable to 
the market-based Cover Tennessee program.  
 
Description of Research  
     This dissertation focuses on market-based health insurance programs. Market-based 
health insurance programs are defined, for the purposes of this research, as programs 
which seek to expand access to the uninsured by facilitating the ability of individuals to 
obtain coverage on the private market or via a market-like model rather than through a 
government-operated program. The market-based programs at issue in this dissertation 
fall into five types:  (1) state high-risk health insurance pools, (2) reinsurance programs, 
(3) limited benefit plans, (4) group purchasing arrangements, and (5) Health Insurance 
Flexibility and Accountability waivers.   
     It is important to note that market-based programs are not referring to efforts that are 
completely separate from the government. A number of programs referred to as market-
based, including high-risk pools and HIFA waivers, are programs which were in some 
way initiated by the government. All of the market-based programs addressed in this 
study had to at least receive some form of approval from the state government before 
implementation could take place. These programs are defined as market-based because 
they function according to market principles (such as requiring clients to pay premiums 
for coverage) or expand access to coverage by increasing access to the private market. 
While the U.S. has considered implementing universal health care throughout its history, 
the last twenty years have seen states taking the lead in the area of health care, largely 
through targeted, incremental programs (Beamer, 2004; Leichter, 2004; Sparer, 2004). 
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While these programs have been widely adopted throughout the U.S. states, they have not 
been given the research attention accorded to larger-scale, federally-initiated programs 
such as Medicaid and SCHIP.   
    The dissertation will look first at the effectiveness of market-based health expansion 
programs. For the purposes of this study, effectiveness is defined as providing social and 
economic benefits which extend beyond the client population being served to the general 
population of the state. While previous studies have examined the effectiveness of state-
level programs in improving the status of the program’s client population (Laudicina, 
1988; Currie and Gruber, 1996; Sloan and Conover, 1998; Chollet, 2002; Jacoby and 
Schneider, 2003; Leichter, 2004; Mead, 2004) there has been only cursory research into 
the societal impacts that  these programs have for general state populations.  
     The critics of the Cover Tennessee program, even though the program was only 
recently adopted, have already issued the standard critiques of a market-based program, 
which are that it is too limited in its funding and enrollment to have any meaningful 
benefit to the client population or the state has a whole. While previous research has 
found that market-based programs like Cover Tennessee are limited in the extent to 
which they can lower the percentage of uninsured in a state, some researchers have 
argued that these programs can have developmental benefits for a state (Batistella and 
Kuder, 1993, as cited in Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007). The first primary research question 
at issue in this dissertation is:  
1) To what extent do market-based health access expansion programs have general 
economic and social benefits for the state as a whole? 
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     The dissertation will next focus on the adoption of market-based health expansion 
programs. Turning to the issue of policy adoption, there is a vast literature which has 
found that policy is adopted at the state level due to various internal and external 
influences (Dawson and Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Cnuddle and McCrone, 1969; 
Barrilleaux and Miller, 1988; Feiock and West, 1993; Grogan, 1994; Coleman, 1999; 
Daley and Garand, 2005). Political influences, including legislative party control and 
ideology, are frequently cited in the literature. Often the hypotheses surrounding these 
influences are premised on a political party or ideological faction being supportive of a 
type of policy for ideological reasons (Entman, 1983; Barrilleaux and Miller, 1988; Meier 
and McFarlane, 1993; Grogan, 1994; Brown, 1995; Appelbaum, 2001; Shipan and 
Volden, 2006; Weissert and Weissert, 2006). However, the market-based health 
expansion programs addressed in this study can often defy traditional ideological labels, 
as they seek to expand access to health insurance coverage (a liberal priority) through 
largely market-based programs (a conservative preference). Therefore, these particular 
programs offer a unique opportunity to reexamine traditional theories regarding 
partisanship, ideology and policy adoption.   
     The example of Tennessee’s experience with TennCare and Cover Tennessee  
raises this issue in regard to market-based health expansion programs. The conventional 
wisdom in health policy research is that Democrats favor more government-oriented 
health reforms, while Republicans champion reforms that are more market-oriented 
(Weissert and Weissert, 2006). However, the previous example of Tennessee health care 
reform notes that both the government-based TennCare program and the market-based 
Cover Tennessee program were enacted during Democratic administrations. This 
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suggests that the partisan orientations regarding health care reforms are not as rigid as 
they are sometimes portrayed. The issue of partisan influence on the adoption of the 
market-based health care expansion programs is at the center of the second primary 
research question in this dissertation: 
2) What relationship does the level of Democratic control of the legislature and 
citizen liberalism have with the adoption of market-based health care access 
expansion programs? 
 
Outline of the Research 
 
          The dissertation will consist of five chapters. The first chapter provides background 
on previous research conducted in the area of access to health insurance. One area of the 
health policy literature which the research builds on highlights the widespread economic 
and societal effects of the lack of health insurance. Previous research highlights the fact 
that lacking access to health care does result in lower individual and societal economic 
productivity, poorer health outcomes, greater expenses for government due to poorer 
health, and negative effects on the health infrastructure (Davis, et al, 2007; Hadley, 2003; 
Wolman and Miller, 2004). However, little research has focused on the effectiveness of 
the programs designed to address these problems. This research seeks to fill that gap.  
     The second chapter focuses on this question of the effectiveness of state-level market-
based health expansion programs. The effectiveness of government programs has been a 
prominently studied topic in health policy literature (Flynn, et al, 1997; Sloan and 
Conover, 1998; Hall, 2000; Abbe, 2002; Chollet, 2002). However, the question of 
effectiveness has largely been narrowly focused on the impact of the programs on the 
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specific client population. While the literature makes a persuasive argument that 
problems like uninsurance create difficulties that extend beyond the uninsured (Davis, et 
al, 2007; National Academies, 2003; Wolman and Miller, 2004), previous studies have 
not been particularly active in terms of examining the effect of health expansion 
programs on these societal consequences. 
     To study the effects of the programs in this dissertation, five models are utilized using 
different socioeconomic outcomes: state health spending, mortality, gross state product, 
emergency outpatients, and expenditures per patient.  The study finds that these market-
based programs are effective in helping to address the issues of reducing mortality per 
capita and emergency outpatients treated, while helping to boost the economic 
productivity of the state as measured by gross state product. The third chapter will 
summarize the results of the effectiveness analyses in the second chapter, as well as 
discussing their implications.  
     The fourth chapter examines how partisanship, ideology and other state-level social 
and political influences affect whether or not a state adopts market-based health insurance 
programs. This chapter will employ an event history model to look at the effect of 
political, social, and need variables on the adoption of market-based state health 
programs.   The percentage of Democratic control of the state legislature was found to be 
significantly and positively related to the adoption of market-based programs. The 
adoption study finds that citizen ideology has a significant and negative relationship to 
the adoption of market-based health insurance programs. These findings taken together 
suggest that Democrats may pursue more pragmatic policy options in the area of health 
care, as opposed to adhering to rigid liberal ideology. In the fifth and final chapter, the 
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study explores how the complementary studies of the effectiveness and adoption of 
market-based health insurance programs inform each other. The two studies suggest that 
the market-based health insurance programs, taken as a whole, are effective in providing 
relief to widespread economic and social problems, while interestingly these programs 
seem to enjoy support from Democrats but not the liberal public. Considering these 
results in light of events surrounding the 2009 health care reform debate at the state and 
national level suggests that these market-based programs may deserve more attention 
than they have received, and may garner that attention in light of recent policy shifts such 
as Tennessee’s move from a government-based to a market-based system.  
 
Limits of the Research 
  
     This study does face a number of limitations which should be acknowledged. First, the 
data used in both the effectiveness and adoption studies are compiled from numerous 
sources, which raise some issues of consistency across variables. However, all of the data 
has been collected from reputable sources, such as the U.S. Census Bureau, the American 
Hospital Association, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which should help 
minimize any complications.  
     Turning to the effectiveness model, an issue related to the data is the fact that some of 
the dependent variables in regard to the effectiveness study are imperfect measures of the 
phenomenon being studied. Most notably, the variable for the mortality per capita in the 
state is an imperfect measure of the overall health of a state. However, it is preferable to 
some composite measures of overall state health that incorporate a variety of factors and 
are therefore likely to introduce a significant amount of endogeneity into the model. 
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Another data issue is the fact that state level data is limited in regard to some of the 
variables that are important for the study. For instance, reliable measures of state-level 
uninsurance are only available reliably from the early 1990’s onward. This places 
considerable limitations on the time frame that can be effectively studied in regard to our 
research questions. However, having data from 1994 through 2003 for all fifty U.S. states 
still provides a data set robust enough to test the hypotheses in question. There are also 
methodological issues in regard to the use of a time series cross-sectional data as it relates 
to the effectiveness study. Most notably, this type of analysis is prone to autocorrelation 
and biased error terms (Beck and Katz, 1995). The time series model used in the 
effectiveness study employs a Prais-Winsten transformation to address autocorrelation 
and utilizes panel-corrected standard errors to address bias in the error terms.  
     Another issue, looking at the event history model, is that a number of cases are lost 
from the model due to the nature of the Cox proportional hazard model. The model 
measures adoption of market-based health programs, and as states cease adopting they 
drop out of the model, resulting in many cases being lost. However, as the data set covers 
the years 1989 through 2002, even with the lost cases the data set still seems robust 
enough to test the hypotheses. An additional issue related to the adoption study, which 
utilizes a Cox proportional hazard model, is that hazard models are only effective with a 
limited number of covariates in the model. This was noted by Blossfeld, Hamerle, and 
Mayer (1989), who wrote that the hazard model should not contain too many parameters 
as this can result in a loss of estimate precision unless the sample size is quite large. 
Therefore, in order to maintain parsimony, some potentially useful explanatory variables 
could not be included in the model. However, the limited number of covariates does force 
11 
 
one to carefully consider which covariates to utilize, so that the researcher assembles the 
best model he or she can.    
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND ON RESEARCH 
 
Costs and Consequences of the Uninsured 
 
     Uninsurance is a serious and growing problem in the United States. A recent report 
from the U.S. Census Bureau found that the percentage of Americans without health 
insurance rose from 15.3 percent in 2005 to 15.8 percent in 2006. In terms of the overall 
numbers, the uninsured population nationwide increased from 44.8 million to 47 million. 
For those Americans with health insurance coverage, employment remains the primary 
source of their insurance, unfortunately the percentage of people covered by 
employment-based insurance decreased to 59.7 percent in 2006 from 60.2 percent in 
2005. Many of those without insurance are children. The percentage of children under the 
age of 18 who were uninsured increased from 10.9 percent in 2005 to 11.7 percent in 
2006. For older Americans, the number of people covered by Medicaid was statistically 
unchanged between 2005 and  2006 (DeNavas-Walt, et al, 2007).  
     The issue of uninsurance has remained on the national agenda because of the serious 
economic and social consequences for the United States. Increases in the uninsured 
contribute to costly reliance on emergency room care and hospital admissions for 
preventable conditions. Uninsured people are more likely to undergo duplicate tests, as 
well as experience delays and errors in test results (Davis, et al, 2007). While many 
assume that poor individuals who cannot afford coverage can receive assistance through 
Medicaid, it is important to note that 64% of uninsured, poor adults are ineligible for 
Medicaid, primarily because childless adults are categorically excluded from Medicaid 
(Dorn, 2008).  
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     Lost economic value due to uninsurance is estimated to be $65-$130 billion a year. 
Impaired health due to lack of health insurance is linked to absenteeism and reduced 
productivity in the workplace. The estimated value for an individual of improved health 
due to expanding coverage is estimated to be $1645-$3280 annually (National 
Academies, 2003). Among Americans aged 51 to 59, poor health has been linked to 
decreasing income and wealth, along with forcing people into early retirement. A general 
finding across studies is that poor health reduces annual earnings by 15 to 30 percent. 
Those in poor health are also less likely to work at all compared to someone in excellent 
health. Even those in poor health who were working made an hourly wage 23% lower 
than those with better health. Depending on the measure of health used, the improvement 
of an employee’s health to “good or excellent” from “poor to fair” could boost earnings 
by 15-20 percent (Hadley, 2003). Mullahy and Sindelar (1993) found that people in good 
health had earnings 37.7 percent higher than people with poor health conditions.  
     Lack of health care also takes an economic toll on individuals and families in regard to 
how much they pay for health care. Uninsured families tend to defer preventative care 
due to cost concerns, which can result in unsatisfactory health outcomes and more 
expensive care. The uninsured tend to be charged more for hospital care than the insured 
because there is no one to negotiate prices. Families with a member lacking health 
insurance are more likely to have medical expenses in excess of 5-10 percent of their 
income than those whose members are all insured (Hadley, 2003).  
     The responsibility for funding health care is divided among a number of levels of 
government, and tends to be fragmented and ill-defined. The federal Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act includes no provisions for paying for emergency room care 
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aside from billing the patient. Emergency room care for the uninsured is largely 
uncompensated, and results in financial burdens for hospitals. These pressures have 
prompted hospital mergers, conversions (public to private, non-profit to for-profit), and 
closures (Hadley, 2003). Such change can create improvements to health services at the 
local level, but it can also have negative consequences to communities such as disruption 
in services, loss of facilities and jobs, and a reduction in state and federal support. Urban 
areas with substantial rates of uninsured people have fewer beds per capita, offer fewer 
services for vulnerable populations, and are less likely to have units for specialized care. 
Uninsurance can also have the effect of forcing health professionals to sacrifice 
preventative care programs for programs to benefit the uninsured, decreasing the overall 
level of community health (Hadley, 2003).  
     The cost of providing health care to the uninsured was estimated at $99 billion in 
2001. Uninsured families paid $26 billion out of pocket, $38 billion was paid by public 
and private insurance for care for those uninsured for part of the year, and the remaining 
$35 billion went uncompensated. The uninsured also create a drag in the health care 
system because they tend to be in poor condition when they enroll in Medicare, and thus 
their costs are higher (Wolman and Miller, 2004).  
     The growing problem of uninsurance and the lack of success in addressing the 
problem at the national level led the U.S. states to pursue different strategies to expand 
coverage. A decrease in federal support and an increase in need have spurred states to 
become innovators in the area of health care, making strides in areas like regulation, 
rationing, and innovative/competitive strategies to cut health care costs (Patel and 
Rushefsky, 1999). States have utilized increased discretion from the federal government 
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to expand initiatives like the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) or 
create new programs (Sparer, 2004).  While the success of states in implementing reform 
has been mixed (Sparer, 2004), by the time of the Clinton plan’s congressional demise 
most state governments had enacted laws to increase portability and access to insurance 
(Stream, 1999). 
 
The Role of States in Health Care 
 
     State and local government activity in health care is not a new trend. States and local 
governments have taken an active role in public health policy since the 1800’s. States’ 
initial involvement was primarily geared toward battling the problem of communicable 
diseases and mental health problems. The twentieth century saw state and local 
governments begin to deliver personal health services and license hospitals. In the 
1960’s, the federal government began to provide support to states for institutions serving 
the poor, particularly with the creation of the Medicaid program. Medicaid increased 
revenue to public hospitals and local health departments. As this support was coming in, 
states increased their role in the regulation and licensing of the health industry, and 
became involved in hospital rate setting (Patel and Rushefsky, 1999).  
     Federal support for state health programs diminished in the 1980s, forcing states to 
shoulder a heavier share of the burden, particularly with regard to the Medicaid program. 
This decrease in federal support led to static Medicaid funding, while the population of 
the poor increased. States were ultimately forced to make a tradeoff between cost 
containment and access to health care. This devolution to the states forced states to 
become innovators in health care. States are in a unique position to be health care 
innovators, notably because of the wider latitude they have with which to experiment 
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with policy (Patel and Rushefsky, 1999). This experimentation is useful because states 
can enact policies which might not be acceptable in other states, such as employer 
mandates (Weissert and Weissert, 2006).  
     However, in the 1980’s many policymakers at the federal level did not in fact see 
states as credible health care leaders, as they were considered to be lacking the political 
will to make tough decisions that might anger either payers or providers. Conventional 
wisdom held that states lacked the fiscal capacity to pursue universal coverage, and any 
truly meaningful reform would have to originate from Washington, DC. However, the 
1990s saw a significant change in the political landscape, with Massachusetts enacting a 
“play or pay” plan (wherein an employer will either provide coverage to employees or 
pay a fee to the state), which preceded the current insurance mandate program. Oregon 
rationed health procedures for a portion of the Medicaid population, and a number of 
states pursuing universal coverage (Five States, 1994). With this change in the states 
came greater discretion and latitude from the federal government. This discretion often 
came in the form of waivers allowing states to forego certain federal requirements related 
to intergovernmental programs like Medicaid. This change in policy is related to a 
perceived increase in administrative capacity at the state level. For instance, governors 
now employ larger and more professional staffs that can provide expertise in managing 
new programs. States have also benefited from high revenues and savings from lower 
utilization of social services. Many states recognized this opportunity and used the 
greater resources to produce a variety of innovative health policies (Sparer, 2004).  
     One of the major initiatives to come out of the 1990s was the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP). This program provided states with federal matching funds 
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to make it easier for them to expand health insurance coverage for uninsured children by 
either building upon Medicaid or funding an alternative program. States were also 
granted authority to provide services directly through expansions of local health 
department clinics or federally qualified health centers. Additionally, states gained the 
power to negotiate contracts with hospitals serving low-income families (Patel and 
Rushefsky, 1999).  
     The results, however, of initiatives other than SCHIP have been varied. While the 
goals of SCHIP were fairly ambitious, a number of the other reforms implemented by the 
states in the 1990’s were modest in scope and impact. Additionally, SCHIP, along with 
many other state health policies, were financed by the federal government and were thus 
subject to regulation from Washington. This sort of intergovernmental policymaking 
tends to encourage incremental policies, rather than sweeping reform (Sparer, 2004). 
States themselves do face a number of obstacles to regulating insurance and expanding 
access to the market, including the federal ERISA Act (which limits the states’ ability to 
regulate self-insured employer coverage), difficulty in organizing small businesses, lack 
of state financial resources, lack of support for government action to regulate health care, 
and the political power held by big business. As a result states have sought approaches to 
reform which are not dependent on significant state funding or strong action by the state 
(Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007).      
     However, this is not to say that they are completely powerless to innovate. States do 
have the means and the will to make positive change in the health care system. Further, 
these policy innovations can be copied by other states and then diffused throughout the 
country (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). In addition to government-based efforts such as 
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SCHIP, a number of states have taken up reforms which seek to increase access to the 
private insurance market, or at least enact programs which function according to market 
principles. These approaches will be addressed next.  
 
Market-based Approaches to Expanding Health Care 
 
Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) define market-based health policies in the following 
manner: “Market-based policies seek to coerce businesses to purchase insurance or, in the 
case of risk pools, use state leverage to reduce insurance prices (but without imposing a 
cost on insurers)” (Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007). For the purposes of this research, 
market-based programs are defined more broadly as programs which seek to make 
private insurance coverage more accessible to those who need it, or programs enacted by 
the government which function according to market principles (i.e. clients still have to 
pay for their coverage). It should be noted that the term market-based is not meant to 
indicate that these programs are entirely divorced from government involvement. In fact, 
in most states the programs addressed in this research were made possible, at least in part, 
by government intervention in the market. Rather than indicating the lack of any 
relationship with government, the term market-based is meant to denote that these 
programs promote coverage expansion through the market, as opposed to a government-
operated social welfare program such as Medicaid.  
     Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) note that the story of the American health care system is 
one of incremental expansion, resulting in a “patchwork” system which, despite 
numerous efforts at reform in the 20th and early 21st centuries, has left approximately 47 
million uninsured. Previous research (Sparer 2003, as cited in Barrilleaux and Brace, 
2007) found that the most successful health reforms involved both the federal and state 
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governments (such as Medicaid and SCHIP) and that that state-level efforts, particularly 
those which could be described as market-based, were unsuccessful. Unlike the state-
based solutions, which assume inherent market failure in health insurance coverage, 
market-based initiatives seek to make adjustments to the private health care market in 
order to allow entry to those previously shut out. Advocates see this approach, which 
depends on voluntary compliance on the part of private insurers, as more efficient, while 
advocates for more state-based activity argue that such efforts are not substantial enough 
to increase provision of coverage. Next we will more closely examine one of the market-
based programs noted by Barrilleaux and Brace (2007), the state high-risk health 
insurance pool.  
 
State High-Risk Health Insurance Pools 
 
     A key element to states expanding their provision of health care services is the 
utilization of non-profit organizations. Kettl (1993) notes that state and local governments 
employ an extensive network of nonprofit contractors in order to deliver many of the 
social services that citizens demand. The vast majority of these contracts are going to 
social services in such areas as hospital management and mental health. Many Medicaid 
programs are also channeled through non-profits at the local level. Often, the federal 
government has been a catalyst for this movement as they have provided grants to state 
and local governments for programs with the idea that the money will be utilized through 
non-profits, due to distrust of politicians at the lower levels (Kettl, 1993).  
     A survey conducted by the International City/County Management Association1 found 
that local governments administering social services often employ a mixed model, where 
                                                 
1
 ICMA, Service Delivery in the 90’s, as cited in Kettl, 2003.  
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government employees directly oversee some programs and others are overseen by 
outside contractors. State and local governments tend to function as holding companies 
which provide outside organizations with the means to provide services (Kettl, 1993). In 
addition to contracting out to existing non-profits for services, states have also taken the 
step of creating their own non-profit entities to expand coverage and improve health care. 
An example of this innovative phenomenon is state high-risk health insurance pools. 
     These pools, currently operational in 34 states, act as independent entities, governed 
by a board of directors and administered by an insurance carrier in the state who offers 
coverage to the uninsurable population.2 These pools were originally created with the 
intent of providing coverage to those who could not receive private coverage due to a 
preexisting condition. However, this limited scope of mission has been expanded through 
the years by federal legislation, including the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accessibility Act and the Trade Adjustment Act (Laudicina, 1988). Today, risk pool 
associations must create a comprehensive insurance policy that meets the needs of the 
medically uninsurable and other groups, while at the same time adhering to guidelines on 
premiums, benefits, and deductibles (Frakt, et al, 2004/2005).   
     The first pools were established in Connecticut and Minnesota in 1976 (Frakt, et al, 
2004/2005). Risk pools allow uninsurable people to obtain coverage, as well as acting as 
a fallback to others who encounter problems with the insurance industry, such as 
unreasonably high premiums (Stearns et al, 1997). The target population for these 
programs tends to be smaller, as the percentage of a state’s population in the individually 
                                                 
2
 Individuals are classified as uninsurable by health insurance companies because their risk premiums are 
not large enough to compensate an insurer for providing coverage (Morrissey, 2008).  
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insured market3 is less than 2% in all states except Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon 
(Achman and Chollet, 2001). Chollet (2002) found that enrollment in risk pools was 
below 1 percent of the individually insured market. Some states only cover individuals, 
while others provide coverage to families. For example, Minnesota’s plan only covers 
individuals, while the plan in Connecticut covers spouses, unmarried children under the 
age of 19, and other dependents who are unmarried and under 19 (Minnesota 
Comprehensive Health Association, 2006; Health Reinsurance Association, 2005).  
     Funding sources for high-risk pools include client premiums, assessments on private 
insurers, and general state revenue (Frakt, et al, 2004/2005). The federal ERISA law 
prevents pools from making any assessments on self-insured employer plans,4 which can 
account for fifty percent of the market in some states (Abbe, October 2002). States put 
caps on out-of-pocket patient expenditures anywhere from $2,000 to $20,000. Waiting 
periods until benefits will be conferred can range from six months to one year, and 
lifetime benefits range from $350,000 (Wyoming) to $2.8 million (Minnesota) (Achman 
and Chollet, 2001). Some states put a cap on annual benefits, with three states having 
benefits amounting to less than $200,000 a year (Chollet, 2002).  
 
The Need for High-Risk Pools 
 
     Much of the need for these high-risk health insurance pools stems from the fact that 
the rising costs of health care have caused insurance companies to become more stringent 
in their underwriting standards, making it difficult for individuals to find health insurance 
                                                 
3
 The individual insurance market is composed of those individuals who purchase health insurance 
coverage privately, rather than receiving coverage under an employer plan.  
4
 Under a self-insured plan, businesses put money into a fund from which they pay employee medical 
claims rather than paying premiums to an insurance company. The business then assumes all of the risk for 
insurance coverage (Park, 2000).  
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(Perry, 2002). Such stringent standards lead to people being deemed “medically 
uninsurable,” i.e. having a serious medical condition which is likely to require extensive 
medical care (Laudicina, 1988). A person may also be considered medically uninsurable 
if they pay significantly higher premiums due to a medical condition, or if the coverage 
comes with an elimination rider5 (State High-Risk Health Insurance Pools, 2005). A 1994 
study found that 0.7 percent of the American population (approximately 2 million people) 
were deemed medically uninsurable by insurance companies (NCPA, 1994). Specific 
conditions rendering one uninsurable may include: aneurysm, diabetes, AIDS, 
rheumatoid arthritis, dialysis, spinal disorders, paralysis, psychosis, and hemophilia 
(AccessWV, 2006). Due to the fact that these high-risk pools behave similarly to private 
insurance companies, they are best characterized as a market-based program. These 
programs function based on a market model in that they charge premiums for their 
coverage, and utilize a network of private sector and non-profit care providers and 
administrative resources in their operation (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007). In 
the next section, this study will examine other market-based programs included in this 
study.   
 
Specific Insurance Expansion Strategies 
 
     A number of other market-based strategies have been employed at the state level to 
address the problem of uninsurance, in addition to the high-risk pools noted above. States 
are in a unique position to be health care innovators, notably because of the wider latitude 
they have in which to experiment with policy (Patel and Rushefsky, 1999).  Of particular 
                                                 
5
 An elimination rider allows insurance companies to specifically exclude a particular condition, body part, 
or system of the body from coverage under an insurance plan (Consumer Guide, 2009).  
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interest for the purposes of this study is the role of state high-risk health insurance pools. 
However, a number of other expansion strategies are addressed in the dissertation as well. 
Another expansion strategy that will be addressed in this study is waivers granted by the 
federal government to allow states to expand their Medicaid populations. About 98,000 
people have gained new coverage through waivers under the Health Insurance Flexibility 
and Accountability Act of 2001. Most states have chosen to use HIFA waivers to expand 
Medicaid above the minimum federal requirements (State Coverage Initiatives, 2007). 
The waivers also contain elements which seek to encourage people to pursue coverage in 
the private market. Owcharenko (2002) cites the guidelines provided by the Department 
of Health and Human Services for implementing the HIFA waivers: 
The Administration puts a particular emphasis on broad statewide approaches that 
maximize private health insurance coverage options and target Medicaid and 
SCHIP resources to populations with income below 200 percent of the Federal 
poverty level.  
     A number of states, including Illinois, Idaho, New Mexico, and Oregon have 
encouraged the purchase of private health insurance by creating or expanding premium 
assistance programs to try to give the private market a more active role in expanding 
coverage to the uninsured (Coughlin, et al, 2006). Therefore, while this effort is classified 
as a market-based approach for the purposes of this research, it could also be 
characterized as mixed.   
     Other important strategies a state might rely on would be initiatives such as  
reinsurance programs, a group purchasing arrangements, and limited benefit plans. A 
reinsurance program can be used to reduce premiums by shifting some of the expense for 
high-cost enrollees to a third party (possibly the state). This is designed to lead to lower 
premiums by reducing incentives for carriers to hold excess reserves. Group purchasing 
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arrangements are public or private efforts to allow more than one small or large employer 
and/or individuals to pool together to collectively purchase health insurance. One other 
type of program employed to address the uninsurance problem is limited-benefit plans. 
Limited-benefit plans are designed to decrease premiums by limiting the number of 
covered services in comprehensive health benefit plans (State Coverage Initiatives 2006).  
     One aspect all of these coverage expansion strategies have in common is that they 
represent to varying degrees government’s attempt to facilitate improving health 
coverage by utilizing tools available in the private market. The next chapter will examine 
the study of the effectiveness of these market-based health insurance programs. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKET-BASED STATE 
HEALTH EXPANSION PROGRAMS 
 
Introduction 
 
     This study assesses the general societal and economic effects of market-based state 
efforts. This study hypothesizes that the implementation of these programs leads to lower 
state health spending, better overall citizen health, greater economic productivity, and a 
more sustainable health care system. The findings in this dissertation lend credence to the 
notion that market-based programs designed to expand health care access to the 
uninsured will yield tangible economic and social benefits for the state as a whole.  
     The previous example of the TennCare/Cover Tennessee experience raises this 
question of whether or not market-based state health expansion programs provide general 
benefits to the state as a whole. TennCare was created in the wake of the failure of the 
Clinton health plan in an attempt to provide universal health care within the state of 
Tennessee, however the program proved financially unsustainable in its original form. 
Governor Phil Bredesen, rather than using his political capital to preserve the TennCare 
program, chose to create a narrower, market-based program known as Cover Tennessee. 
Not long after its implementation, the Cover Tennessee program came under criticism for 
not meeting its enrollment targets. This highlights the idea (noted in the previous chapter) 
that the success of these market-based programs is measured narrowly in terms of 
enrollment and decrease in the uninsured population. However, recent research in the 
area of health policy (Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007; Battistella and Kuder, 1993) suggest 
that the effect of these programs should be looked at in a broader sense, as they may have 
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developmental impacts for a state not accounted for in the narrower measures of 
enrollment and percentage of uninsured.  
     This chapter tests the idea that market-based health insurance expansion programs can 
provide general benefits for the people of a state. It begins with background on the 
economic and health consequences of uninsurance, as well as previous research on 
market-based health expansion programs. The hypotheses for the effects of the market-
based health insurance expansion programs on the dependent variables are presented. 
Following the presentation of hypotheses, there is a discussion of the control variables 
used in the analysis, as well as the research methodology used in the study. The chapter 
concludes with the results of the analysis of the effects of the market-based programs on 
the dependent variables.       
 
Background on the Economic and Health Consequences of Uninsurance 
 
     In order to assess the effectiveness of market-based health expansion programs in 
alleviating economic and societal ills created by uninsurance, we must first examine what 
effects the lack of insurance has on government health spending, the overall health of a 
state’s population, a state’s overall economic strength, and the sustainability of the state’s 
medical infrastructure. Government efforts to expand health insurance coverage are 
promoted on a number of grounds. One is the humanitarian argument that in a nation as 
wealthy as the United States all citizens should have access to basic health care (Health 
Care Reform, 2009). However, a more tangible argument that may work in favor of 
expansion advocates may be that expanding coverage would provide benefits to society 
as a whole. These benefits could be translated into dollar amounts in the form of 
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economic gains and better health outcomes. In the following sections, this dissertation 
reviews the economic ills created when individuals do not have health insurance, which 
include increases in government health spending, reductions in health outcomes, 
decreases in economic productivity, and stress on the medical infrastructure.  
 
Effect of Uninsurance on Government Health Spending 
 
     The lack of insurance has several effects on government health spending. The 
responsibility for health care spending is shared by numerous levels of government, a 
system which is best characterized as fragmented and ill-defined. The literature on 
uninsurance suggests that lack of health insurance coverage imposes long term costs on 
the state and federal government, as uninsured people are likely to be in worse physical 
condition when they reach 65 and enroll in Medicare, thus their cost to Medicare is 
higher (Wolman and Miller, 2004). Heffler, et al. (2005) found that health care costs are 
shifting significantly from the private to the public sector, and by 2014 total (both 
governmental and non-governmental) health spending will represent 18.7 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP), up from 15.3 percent in 2003. Additionally, state and 
local governments make payments to hospitals through tax appropriations which the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Committee considers reimbursement for treatment of 
uninsured patients. It is estimated that state and local governments spent $3.1 billion 
dollars in tax appropriations in 2001 to reimburse hospitals for the uncompensated care of 
uninsured patients. State and local governments also bear a financial burden from the 
uncompensated care of the uninsured through funding of indigent care programs (Hadley 
and Holahan 2003). These studies indicate that it is essential that government implement 
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strategies to help contain the growing cost of health care. One method of doing this is to 
expand coverage to the uninsured to reduce instances of uncompensated emergency care. 
Some advocates argue for expanding coverage through a government program, while 
others argue for market-based programs that expand access to coverage in the private 
market.  
 
Effect of Uninsurance on Health Outcomes 
 
     Lack of health insurance also has significant effects on health outcomes. Health 
outcomes are a change in the health status of an individual, group or population which is 
attributable to a planned intervention or series of interventions, regardless of whether 
such an intervention was intended to change health status (WHO, 1998). In regard to 
health outcomes for a state, people who are uninsured for a full year receive 
approximately 55% of the medical care of those who did have coverage, even with 
uncompensated care taken into account. Specifically, uninsured people receive less 
preventative care, are diagnosed with more advanced diseases, and once diagnosed do not 
receive adequate care and have higher mortality rates (Hadley and Holahan, 2004). 
Looking at health outcomes as they relate to infant mortality (a common measure of 
health outcomes), Currie and Gruber (1996) found that a 15.1 percentage increase in 
children eligible for Medicaid between 1984 and 1992 is estimated to have decreased 
child mortality by 5.1 percent. Levy and Meltzer (2001) found consistent evidence 
through quasi-experimental studies that health insurance improves health, although the 
effect is considerably more pronounced for lower-income people than higher income 
individuals. Dorn (2008) estimated that 137,000 adults between the ages of 25-64 died 
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due to lack of insurance between 2000 and 2006. In the same article, Dorn noted that 
providing all uninsured adults between 55 and 64 years of age with health insurance 
would have lowered mortality in that population by 27 percent (Dorn, 2008). He 
concludes that in excess of 13,000 people in the 55-64 year old demographic die as a 
result of being uninsured, “plac[ing] uninsurance third on a list of leading causes of death 
for this age group, below only heart disease and cancer” (McWilliams, et al., 2004 as 
cited in Dorn, 2008).  
     The negative health outcomes created by the lack of health insurance presents 
economic and social challenges for the U.S. states. The economic challenges will be 
addressed in the next section. In regard to the social challenges, the health difficulties 
created by lack of insurance, particularly premature deaths, have detrimental effects to 
families and communities which are difficult to quantify. However, the number of deaths 
themselves provides some hard data to illustrate the humanitarian toll taken by the 
uninsured problem. Some health expansion advocates argue for the use of market-based 
health insurance programs, which could serve to increase insurance coverage but also 
provide an economic development benefit. 
 
Effects of Uninsurance on a State’s Economy 
 
     Several studies have examined the economic impacts of the lack of health insurance 
on a state’s economy. One obvious argument demonstrated in the literature is that 
impaired health is related to absenteeism at work and reduced job productivity. 
According to one estimate, almost one-fifth of the working age population lacks health 
coverage (National Academies 2003). Updating previous estimates of lost economic 
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productivity due to uninsurance, Hadley and Holahan (2004) found that dollars lost 
nationally as a result of uninsurance amounts to approximately $103 billion annually, 
substantially more than the $48 billion which government would need to spend to provide 
coverage. This additional $48 billion government spending would go toward Medicare, 
Medicaid, and tax subsidies for private insurance, which would constitute less than 3% of 
total personal health care spending in the U.S., and would only increase the share of GDP 
going to health care costs by 0.4% (Hadley and Holahan, 2004).  
     Studies have also found that poor health reduces annual personal earnings by 15 to 30 
percent (Hadley, 2003). Mullahy and Sindelar (1993) found that individuals in good 
health had earnings 37.7 percent higher than people with poor health conditions. Those in 
poor health were also less than half as likely to work compared to someone in excellent 
health, and even if they were working their hourly wage was 23 percent lower. 
Depending on the measure of health used, improving a person’s health status from “poor 
or fair” to “good or excellent” or reducing the prevalence of a particular condition could 
increase personal annual earnings by 15-20 percent. In addition to finding a direct link 
between poor health and reduced personal income and wealth among Americans aged 51 
to 59, it has also been cited as the primary issue leading people to leave the work force 
prematurely (Hadley, 2003).  
     Another factor influencing reduced productivity (and hence, a negative impact on a 
state’s economy) is that, particularly in recent years, increases in health care costs have 
had a significant impact on employers and their employees. Increased health costs have 
traditionally been passed on to insurance companies who then pass the costs on to 
employers who provide health insurance for their employees. Employers, often due to 
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mandates that they provide health insurance for their workers, are left with difficult 
tradeoffs: increase health benefits which will then need to be offset by reduced wages or 
non-wage fringe benefits or pass the increased costs on to employees. This tradeoff will 
determine the ultimate impact on employment (Flynn, Wade, and Holahan 1997). The 
employment effects of the cost of health care would be expected to affect economic 
productivity in a state. Some researchers have argued that market-based programs can 
have positive developmental effects, partially through its benefits to businesses 
(Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007).  
 
Effects of Uninsurance on the Medical Infrastructure of a State 
 
      In regard to the effects on hospitals and health care costs, uninsured families tend to 
use fewer preventative health services and defer care due to cost concerns. Forgoing 
preventative care leads to more costly care later on and less satisfactory outcomes. 
Hospitals tend to charge uninsured people higher prices than the insured because there is 
no one to negotiate prices. Families with an uninsured member who suffers an injury or 
illness are more likely to have medical expenses exceed 5 to 10 percent of their income 
than insured families. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, which requires 
emergency rooms to provide medical screening and, if necessary, treatment, makes no 
provision for payment other than billing the patient. Uncompensated hospital services go 
largely unpaid and create financial burdens for hospitals (Wolman and Miller 2004).  
     Financial pressures, from uncompensated care and other causes, have prompted 
hospital mergers, conversions from public to private ownership or from private non-profit 
to for-profit status, and closures. Such changes can improve health services locally, but 
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can also cause disruptions, loss of facilities and jobs, and a loss of public dollars flowing 
to the community. Urban areas with relatively high uninsured rates have fewer beds per 
capita, offer fewer services for vulnerable populations, and are less likely to have 
specialized care units. Preventative care programs may be reduced to compensate for 
increased need to care for uninsured residents, which may decrease the overall health of 
the community (Wolman and Miller, 2004).  
 
Previous Research on the Effectiveness of Market-Based Health Expansion Programs 
 
     While the literature above illustrates that considerable attention has been given to the 
various consequences of uninsurance, much of the research regarding the effectiveness of 
market-based health expansion programs has been quite narrow in focus. In this section, 
the dissertation will discuss previous research into and evaluations of market-based 
health insurance expansion programs. Recall that for the purposes of this research 
market-based health expansion programs refer to state high-risk health insurance pools, 
limited benefit plans, group purchasing arrangements, reinsurance programs, and Health 
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers. A characteristic which is common 
across these evaluations is that they are focused on rather narrow program outputs rather 
than outcomes. As will be discussed later, some recent research has addressed the general 
developmental effects of these programs. 
     Previous research on state high-risk health insurance pools indicates that evaluations 
of these programs have focused on the level of enrollment and the effect on a state’s level 
of uninsured. The amount of time people spend in a risk pool varies widely (Stearns and 
Mroz, 1995). The creation of new pools increased enrollment to 190,361 as of the end of 
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2006 (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007). The percentage of the uninsurable 
actually served by risk pools varies from state to state. In 2000, Minnesota’s pool covered 
8% of the uninsurable, while Connecticut’s covered 54% of the uninsurable (Frakt, Pizer, 
and Wrobel, 2002). The figures are considerably different if one looks at what percentage 
of the state’s uninsured population is covered by the pools. As of the end of 2006, 
Minnesota’s pool covered approximately 7.2% of a state’s uninsured population, while 
Connecticut covered only about 0.64% of the state’s uninsured (Comprehensive Health 
Insurance, 2007). While these past evaluations provide useful information regarding 
additional coverage created by the high-risk pools, they do not provide any sense of the 
general social and economic benefits created by these pools.  
     Evaluations of other market-based programs have been similarly narrow in terms of 
their focus on enrollment and effects on the uninsured population. An evaluation of 
reinsurance programs in three U.S. states focused on “how much benefit it achieve[d] 
within its target population and at what cost,” as well as the degree to which the programs 
created market stability and segmented different populations within the insurance market 
(Bovbjerg, et al, 2008). Friedenzohn (2004) conducted an evaluation of limited-benefit 
plans which focused heavily on difficulties in achieving significant program enrollments. 
The author did conclude her study by noting that a full examination of the limited benefit 
plans would need to consider additional outcomes such as crowd-out, adverse selection, 
and effects on safety-net providers (Friendenzohn, 2004). An examination of Health 
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers provided to the State Coverage 
Initiatives National Meeting reported that “HIFA has expanded coverage, though perhaps 
not to the degree originally anticipated because of budget constraints” (Sachs 2006, p. 9). 
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This finding was supported by a study conducted by Coughlin, et al (2006), which found 
that the ten HIFA demonstrations in place by the end of 2005 had expanded coverage to 
300,000 people, however it goes on to note that an obstacle to these programs’ 
implementation and effectiveness has been budget constraints (Coughlin, et al, 2006).  
     Research focused on a variety of market-based health expansion strategies found that 
these policies were successful in one respect (promoting the development of new 
insurance markets), but less successful in terms of actually decreasing the percentage of 
uninsured (Hall 2000, as cited Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007). Market-based expansion 
efforts focused on increasing employer offerings of insurance were successful in 
increasing the number of those offerings, but due to high costs to employees not many 
workers availed themselves of such offerings (Sloan and Conover, 1998; Jensen and 
Morrissey, 1999 as cited in Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007).  
     This research suggests that the previous evaluations of market-based health insurance 
programs are in fact too narrowly tailored, and should further explore the general 
economic, social, and health effects of these programs. Weissert and Weissert (2006) 
note that government engages in or promotes a number of practices related to health care 
as they have implications for society as a whole. These include vaccinations and 
sanitation laws, as the susceptibility to and spread of infectious diseases can have effects 
on a significant portion of a state’s population. There is also the problem of “free riders,” 
where healthy people decline coverage, depending on emergency rooms for treatment in 
the event of a catastrophic condition (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). This study analyzes 
the effects of market-based health insurance programs on selected economic, social, and 
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health indicators which apply to a state’s population as a whole. The results of the study  
indicate that these programs do have effects in all three areas. 
 
Conceptual Framework/Hypotheses/Data 
 
     This study expands on the previous research regarding the effectiveness of market-
based health expansion programs on improving social and economic conditions. In this 
section, the hypotheses to be examined are presented. The study utilizes a pooled cross-
sectional time series regression model with adjustments to account for the effects of 
heteroskedasticity in the model. The study examines the effects of these market-based 
state health expansion programs in 50 U.S. states for the years 1994-2003, for an N of 
500. These years were selected for analysis as this period of time was a particularly active 
one for the enactment of state-level health programs. The cumulative effects of market-
based health insurance programs on selected economic, social, and health indicators at 
the state level are analyzed using cross-sectional time series regression. This is done 
using an additive index of how many market-based health expansion programs have been 
implemented in the state. The results indicate that greater adoption of these market-based 
has positive effects on mortality per capita, the gross state product, and emergency 
outpatients treated.  
     In order to test the effectiveness of market based health programs, this study employs 
five different models in the analysis, which look at the effect of the programs on state 
health care spending, the state’s economy, overall state health levels and the health care 
system in the state.  
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Independent Variable of Interest 
     The primary independent variable of interest in this study is an index of market-based 
health expansion programs. This index indicates the degree to which states have 
implemented the five market-based health expansion programs of interest in the analysis: 
high-risk pools, limited benefit plans, reinsurance programs, group purchasing 
arrangements, and Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers. The index 
measures the presence of the programs on a 0-5 index, 0 if a state has implemented none 
of the programs and 5 if a program has implemented all of the possible programs. 
Information regarding the adoption of these programs in the states was reported by the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s web site, State Coverage Initiatives.  
     This variable allows us to capture an overall measure of state effort to expand access 
to coverage to the uninsured through market-based programs. As these programs do 
utilize different mechanisms to expand coverage to different populations within a state, to 
truly gauge their impact, both in regards to their target populations or the general public, 
would be difficult. However, this study is less interested in the specific ways in which 
these programs expand coverage and their individual success than a state’s overall 
willingness to utilize multiple market-based strategies to address the problem of 
uninsurance and whether or not this policy effort on the part of the state translates into 
tangible benefits for the state in terms of lower state spending on health, better overall 
health outcomes, higher gross state product, and stronger medical infrastructure.  
 
Hypotheses Regarding Independent Variable of Interest 
 
     The first model in this analysis looks at the effect of the presence of market-based 
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state health programs on the percentage of state expenditures devoted to health care. The 
dependent variable for state health spending is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau 
Statistical Abstract. A significant portion of these expenditures represent state 
government reimbursements to hospitals for uncompensated care provided by hospitals. 
The hypothesis in regard to this dependent variable is that the presence of the market-
based state health programs will reduce the percentage of state health spending as the 
programs do not represent significant additional spending for the state, but are able to 
reduce the amount of uninsured people utilizing uncompensated care. This reduction of 
uncompensated care will therefore reduce the need for the state to reimburse hospitals for 
that care, and fewer uninsured people will translate into lower levels of state spending in 
other health-related areas. However, it should be noted that most of the market-based 
programs addressed in this study do not serve individuals who might benefit from social 
welfare programs like Medicaid, which is the single-largest item in many state budgets 
(Feldstein, 2007). This study investigates whether market-based programs do have a 
beneficial relationship with state spending on health care.  Formally stated, the first 
hypothesis is that a greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs 
will have a negative relationship to state spending on health care.  
H1: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a 
negative relationship to state spending on health care. 
 
     The second model in this study examines the effect of market-based health programs 
on the overall health of a state’s citizenry. The variable for overall health used in the 
analysis is the state mortality rate per 100,000 as reported in the U.S. Census Bureau 
Statistical Abstract. While this represents a rather gross measure of overall state health, 
this study contends that healthier populations (i.e. populations with more ready access to 
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health care) will exhibit lower mortality rates, which is supported by previous research 
examining the relationship between self-evaluations of health and mortality (Lawrence 
and Assmann, 1997). It should be noted that measures of mortality due to more specific 
conditions were utilized in previous versions of the model, with similar results.  The 
primary hypothesis in regard to this dependent variable is that the presence of market-
based health programs will serve to lower state mortality rates through greater access to 
preventative health care, particularly for traditionally underserved populations. 
Hypothesis 2 is formally stated as a greater presence of market-based state health 
expansion programs will have a negative relationship to a state’s mortality per capita.  
H2: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a 
negative relationship to a state’s mortality per capita. 
 
     The third model examines the effect of the presence of the market-based state health 
programs, controlling for other economic and social factors, on the wealth of a state as 
measured by the gross state product per capita (as reported in the U.S. Census Bureau 
Statistical Abstract). The primary hypothesis of the model is that the presence of market-
based state health programs will increase the overall wealth of a state by increasing the 
productivity of the state’s workforce through better health. Hypothesis 3 is formally 
stated as a greater presence of market-based health expansion programs will have a 
positive relationship to gross state product.   
H3: A greater presence of market-based health expansion programs will have a positive 
relationship with gross state product. 
 
     The fourth model in the analysis investigates the effect of the presence of market-
based state health programs on the per capita level of emergency outpatients treated. The 
dependent variable for emergency outpatients per 1,000 is reported in the American 
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Hospital Association publication, Hospital Statistics. The literature on uninsurance in the 
United States notes that one negative outcome of people in the United States being 
uninsured is that uninsured people frequently delay seeking medical care for serious 
health conditions until the matter becomes critical and they must seek care for the 
condition in a hospital emergency room. Data released by the Department of Health and 
Human Services indicated that one-fifth of the 120 emergency room visits in 2006 
involved uninsured people (AHRQ, 2009). This can place significant strain on hospitals, 
both financially and in terms of being able to treat patients in a timely manner. The 
hypothesis in regard to this dependent variable is that the greater presence of market-
based state health programs will reduce the number of emergency outpatients treated in 
hospitals by allowing people to seek preventative care, thus reducing instances of people 
delaying care to the point where it becomes an emergency situation. Hypothesis 4 is 
formally stated as a greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs 
will have a negative relationship to emergency outpatients treated.   
H4: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a 
negative relationship to emergency outpatients treated.  
 
     The fifth and final model in this analysis looking at the effectiveness of market-based 
state health programs examines the relationship between the programs and the hospital 
expenditures per patient. The data for expenditures per patient is reported in the 
American Hospital Association’s Hospital Statistics. The literature suggests that lack of 
health insurance can increase the level of expenditures per patient due to people delaying 
care until more expensive care is necessary (Schwartz, 2007). The hypothesis regarding 
this dependent variable is that expanding access to care through market-based state health 
programs will have a negative relationship to expenditures per patient, as these programs 
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will increase access to health care for these traditionally underserved populations and will 
reduce instances of people delaying care until their condition becomes catastrophic. It 
should be noted that the literature indicates numerous factors internal to hospitals which 
can serve to increase incidents of adverse events which can in turn drive up patient costs 
per day, including “poor quality care, understaffing, and lack of access to skilled care” 
(Forrest, et al, 2002, p. 24). Garson and Engelhard (2008) also cite evidence that 
preventative medicine does not actually reduce costs. Despite the conflicting evidence, 
the hypothesis as formally stated is a greater presence of market-based state health 
expansion programs will have a negative relationship on expenditures per patient.   
H5: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a 
negative relationship on expenditures per patient.  
 
     The chart below summarizes the hypotheses for the models included in this study: 
                                                  
Table 3-1: Relationships between Market-based Health Expansion  Index   
and Dependent Variables 
 
 Market-based  
Health Index 
State Spending - 
Mortality Per Capita - 
Gross State Product + 
Emergency 
Outpatients 
- 
Expenditures per 
Patient 
- 
 
                                        
Control Variables 
     It should be noted that the same control variables are utilized across the five models 
41 
 
in this study investigating the relationship between market-based health programs and 
dependent variables. The logic of utilizing the same control variables across models is not 
that these control variables directly explain variation in the dependent variables, but that 
these variables affect the relationship between market-based programs and the dependent 
variables in very particular ways across the models. With this in mind, the control 
variables can be divided into three categories: Category 1 is control variables that also 
expand access to insurance in lieu of market-based programs; Category 2 is control 
variables which hinder access to market-based programs, and Category 3 is control 
variables which stand to facilitate the creation of general societal and economic benefits 
through the provision of health care and better implementation of the market-based 
programs.    
 
Control Variables Which Expand Access to Insurance 
     In addition to the index of market-based health expansion efforts, the model also seeks 
to account for effects of government-based efforts to decrease the percentage of 
uninsured in a state. This is done using independent variables which control for the 
presence of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program and the use of Medicaid 1115 
waivers. These two programs account for the two most significant government initiatives 
to expand access to health insurance implemented at the state level during the period of 
study. These variables are based on information regarding the implementation of these 
programs taken from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s web site State Coverage 
Initiatives. Previous research by Bernick and Myers (2008) found that, over time, the 
SCHIP program did contribute to lower levels of uninsurance in the state. Healthy policy 
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analysts, such as Weissert and Weissert (2006), note that the 1115 waivers have been 
used to expand coverage for long term care, home health care, mental health care, the 
poor, and adults between the ages of 19 and 64. However, limited attention has been 
given to the relationship between the waivers and the level of uninsurance in the state. In 
their study, Bernick and Myers (2008) did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between the Medicaid waivers and the level of uninsured in the state. Nevertheless, due 
to their widespread implementation it is expected that the 1115 waivers would be 
associated with lower levels of uninsurance.      
     A measure of the percentage of union membership in a state as reported by the U.S. 
Census Bureau Statistical Abstract is also included in the models. This is important to 
take into account, as unions have historically been a dependable source of health 
insurance benefits, and thus the higher the level of unionization in a state the more likely 
a higher percentage of a state’s population would be expected to have access to health 
insurance benefits. Unionization has also proven to be a significant variable in previous 
models of economic development (Brace, 1993). Morrissey (2008) notes that organized 
labor spurred the proliferation of health coverage in the 20th century, and Feldstein(2007)   
notes that many large unions provide generous health benefits to their members. 
 
Control Variables Which Serve to Limit Effectiveness of Market-based Programs 
      
     Another set of control variables included in the effectiveness models focus on forces 
which could serve to limit the effectiveness of market-based programs. One measure is 
the percentage of uninsured individuals residing in a state, as reported in the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Statistical Abstract. While this study is examining the effect of market-based 
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Table 3-2: Hypothesized Relationships Between Health Expansion Control Variables    
and Dependent Variables1 
 
 SCHIP Medicaid 1115 Unionization 
State Spending - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Mortality Per 
Capita 
- - - 
Gross State 
Product 
+ + + 
Emergency 
Outpatients 
- - - 
Expenditures 
per Patient 
- - - 
 
 
health expansion efforts on indicators other than the uninsurance rate, the level of need in 
a state could theoretically affect the ability of these market-based initiatives to have any 
meaningful effect on the dependent variables. For example, if a state has an exceptionally 
high uninsurance rate which is contributing to a higher rate of mortality in the state, 
market-based programs would need to be that much more effective in order to overcome 
the uninsurance problem and improve mortality levels. Previously cited literature laid out 
the very serious consequences of being uninsured (DeNavas-Walt, et al, 2007; Davis, et 
al, 2007; National Academies, 2003; Hadley, 2003).    
     Another variable included in the models to account for the size of the problem the 
market-based programs are confronting is a measure of the percentage of people living in 
poverty in the state. The level of poverty in a state is likely to have a significant impact 
on the dependent variables included in the model, particularly mortality and gross state 
product. Therefore, a higher level of poverty in a state could be expected to hinder the 
ability of market-based programs to have a meaningful impact on these dependent 
variables. Previous research has shown a significant and positive relationship between 
poverty and uninsurance (Bernick and Myers, 2008), which could also hinder the 
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effectiveness of market-based programs.  The information regarding state poverty is 
taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract.  
     The percentage of unemployed people in the state as reported in the U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical Abstract is also included in the analysis. This variable is included in 
the analysis as it is expected that the larger the size of the unemployed population in a 
state, the more difficult it will be for the market-based health expansion programs to have 
a meaningful impact on the dependent variables, particularly as a number of these 
programs may assist people in obtaining coverage through their employers. The majority 
of Americans, 59.3%, still receive health insurance through their employer (DeNavas-
Walt, et al, 2007). Examined over time, unemployment has been found to have a 
significant and positive relationship with the uninsured (Bernick and Myers, 2008).  
     A fourth variable included in this category of control variables is the percentage of a 
state which is metropolitan. This variable could be relevant to the effect of the market-
based health expansion programs on the dependent variables, as metropolitan areas 
confront a number of challenges in regards to quality and delivery of health care 
(AMSA.org, 2009). However, it is important to note that these challenges can be counter-
balanced to some degree by advantages which metropolitan areas can hold, including 
higher levels of economic activity (Metropolitan Policy Program, 2009). Therefore, 
taking into account the demographic character of a state in regards to whether it is more 
urban or rural could help to clarify the effects of the market-based programs on the 
dependent variables. The hypothesized relationships between these control variables and 
the dependent variables are illustrated in Table 3-3 below.   
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Table 3-3: Hypothesized Relationships between Control Variables Which Limit Access to Health Care and 
the Dependent Variables1 
 
 Poverty Unemployment Uninsured Metropolitan 
State Spending + + + + 
Mortality Per 
Capita 
+ + + + 
Gross State 
Product 
- - - - 
Emergency 
Outpatients 
+ + + + 
Expenditures 
per Patient 
+ + + + 
 
 
 
Control Variables Which Help to Facilitate the Creation of the General Societal and 
Economic Benefits 
     The third category of control variables focuses on variables which could help to 
facilitate the creation of general economic and social benefits through market-based 
programs via better health care provision and program implementation. One variable in 
this vein is institutional ideology. This is a measure of the liberalism of a state’s 
government which was developed by Berry, et al (1998). Public policy literature provides 
evidence that programs are more successfully implemented in situations where the 
government is more ideologically sympathetic to the program being implemented (Hays, 
1996). This research found that more liberal governments more successfully implement 
liberal programs, while more conservative governments are more successful in 
implementing programs of a conservative nature. This variable was computed as a 
weighted average of the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education Scores for the 
governor and the state congressional delegation. This variable is on a 0 (very 
conservative)-100 (very liberal) scale.  
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     The model also seeks to account for the level of health infrastructure in the state. The 
health infrastructure is measured by the number of hospital beds per 1,000 in the state as 
reported in the American Hospital Association Hospital Statistics. For the market-based 
state health programs to have the hypothesized effects on the dependent variables, a state 
must have the infrastructure to successfully deliver the services which the insurance 
coverage provides individuals access to. Therefore it is hypothesized in this study that the 
more hospital beds in the state the more effective the market-based health programs will 
be in providing economic and health care benefits. The American Medical Student 
Association notes the numerous problems which people in both urban and rural areas can 
have accessing health care resources that may result in lower quality of life, as does 
Hadley (2003) and Wolman and Miller (2004). However, it should be noted that there are 
a number of studies (Fischer, et al, 2000; Bazzoli, et al, 2003) suggest a negative 
association between hospital capacity and health outcomes.       
     Another control variable related to capacity included in the analysis is state employees 
per capita as reported in The Book of the States. This variable is included as a measure of 
state administrative capacity. The hypothesis in regards to this variable is that states with 
greater administrative capacity will be in a better position to implement and regulate the 
programs in the interest of improved effectiveness. This improved implementation and 
regulation will translate into the programs having greater economic and social effects for 
the state. Hackey (1998) notes the importance of public administrative capacity, as 
erosion in such capacity may limit the ability to engage in major new initiatives or 
maintaining existing functions. Under such circumstances government may be 
overwhelmed by the private sector. Rich, Deye, and Mazur (2004) argue that state 
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governments lack the administrative capacity to engage in large redistributive programs. 
While market-based programs are not in need of the same administrative resources as a 
program like Medicaid, most of them still require some degree of administration action.  
 
Table 3-4: Hypothesized Relationships between Variables Which Facilitate Access to Health Care  
and the Dependent Variables2  
 
 Hospital Beds 
per Capita 
State Employment 
per Capita 
Institutional Ideology 
State Spending - - - 
Mortality Per 
Capita 
- - - 
Gross State 
Product 
+ + + 
Emergency 
Outpatients 
- - - 
Expenditures per 
Patient 
- - - 
 
 
     Table 3-4 illustrates the hypothesized relationships between the independent variables 
of interest and the dependent variables in the analysis.  
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Effectiveness Models 
Dependent Variables 
 
     Looking at the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used to evaluate the 
socioeconomic effects of market-based health insurance programs, the central value for 
the dependent variable measuring the percentage of state spending devoted to health was 
7.93, indicating that the “middle” state in the data set spent approximately 8% of its 
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Table 3-5: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
 
Median Min. Max. Skewness 
Mortality 894.3 398.6 1166.3 -.844 
State Spending 7.93 1.49 18.82 .710 
Emergency 
Outpatients 
358.5 140.5 610.6 .449 
Expenditures 
per Patient 
907.8 560.0 1548.7 .603 
Gross State 
Product 
90.7 12.3 1044.8 2.8 
 
 
budget on health care related items. This variable was found to have a slight positive 
skew (.710) in relation to the normal distribution. The lowest level of state spending on 
health care in the data set 1.49%, and the highest level was 18.82%. The variable 
representing the level of mortality per 100,000 in a state was found to have a median of 
894.3 and a skewness of -.844. This indicates that the data is centered around 900 deaths 
per 100,000 and is skewed slightly in a negative direction when compared to the normal 
distribution. The lowest level of mortality per capita recorded in a state was 399 and the 
highest level was 1166. The third dependent variable in the effectiveness chapter, gross 
state product in constant (2000) dollars, has a median of 90,700,000,000, with a 
minimum value of 12,300,000,000 and a maximum value of 1,044.800,000,0000. This 
variable actually has a significant positive skew (2.77).  
     The middle value for the level of emergency outpatients treated per capita in the data 
is 358.45, as compared to the minimum value of 140.5 and the maximum value of 610.6. 
This data is slightly positively skewed with a value of .449. The median for the 
dependent variable examining expenditures per patient per day is $907.80 with a 
moderate positive skew of .603. There is significant variability within this data, with a 
minimum value of $560 and a maximum value of $1548.70.  
Independent Variables 
     Turning our attention to the independent variables in the effectiveness analysis, the 
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primary variable of interest, the index of market-based health expansion programs, had a 
mode of 1, indicating that most of the U.S. states during the time period of the study 
(49.8%) had adopted one of the market-based expansion programs. The most market-
based programs adapted by any of the states during the period of study was three (out of a 
possible five). Turning to another index of interest, measuring the presence and 
expansiveness of state high-risk health insurance pools, the mode for this variable was 0, 
indicating that during the period of study (1989-2003) most of the states had not enacted 
high-risk pools. It should be noted that as of 2009, 34 states have enacted high-risk pools. 
Interestingly, while almost half of the cases in the analysis did not have high-risk pools, 
25.2% had high-risk pools indexed at 4, indicating that they charged Standard Risk Rates 
between 150% and 175% and were relatively affordable. Thus of those states which did 
adopt high-risk pools a plurality of them were not priced out of reach for health care 
consumers.   
     Looking at the measures of central tendency for the dummy variables controlling for 
other contributors to the expansion of health care access, the SCHIP dummy variable had 
a mode of 1 and the Medicaid 1115 variable had a mode of 0, indicating that during the 
period of study most states had adopted the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
but most states had not implemented a Medicaid 1115 waiver. Examining the third 
variable in the analysis controlling for factors leading to health care expansion, the 
median of the unionization variable was 13.7%, indicating that, in general, U.S. states 
tend to be about 14% unionized. The lowest level of unionization was 2.4% and the 
     In the final model, examining the effect of the presence and accessibility of high-risk 
pools, as well as other variables, on the expenditures per patient of hospitals in a state, the 
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highest level in the dataset was 51.6%. This variable had a positive skew of 1.13. 
The next group of variables to be examined is those controlling for factors which 
could inhibit the effective of the market-based health expansion programs. The median 
for the first of these variables, the percentage of uninsured in the state, was 13.6%. The 
lowest level of uninsured in a state was 6.8%, while the highest percentage of uninsured 
 
Table 3-6: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables in the Effectiveness Study 
 
Median Mode Min. Max. Skewness 
Market-based 
Index 
n/a 1 0 3 .768 
High-Risk 
Pool Index 
n/a 0 0 5 .270 
Medicaid 1115 n/a 0 0 1 1.2 
SCHIP n/a 1 0 1 -.359 
Unionization 13.7 n/a 2.4 51.6 1.13 
Uninsured 13.6 n/a 6.8 26.5 .694 
Poverty 11.6 n/a 4.5 26.4 .773 
Unemployment 5 n/a .09 10.8 .138 
Metropolitan 70 n/a 23.5 100 -.382 
Institutional 
Ideology 
43.5 n/a 0 97.9 .129 
Beds per 
Capita 
3.1 n/a 1.8 7 .955 
State 
Employment 
per Capita 
172 n/a 103 452 2.23 
 
 
in a state was 26.5%. The second variable in this group, the percentage of a state’s 
population in poverty, had a median of 11.6%, with a minimum of 4.5% and a maximum 
of 26.4%. The percentage of unemployed in the state, a third variable in the group, had a 
median of 5%. The minimum and maximum values for this variable were .09% and 
10.8%. All three of these variables were positively skewed. The fourth variable 
controlling for factors inhibiting effectiveness, the percentage of metropolitan area in a 
state, has a median of 70%, indicating that the “middle” state in the data was mostly 
metropolitan in nature. The minimum percentage of metropolitan area in a state was 
23.5% and the maximum was 100%. This variable had a negative skew.  
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     The final group of independent variables controls for factors which may facilitate the 
effectiveness of the market-based programs. The median for the first of these controls, 
the level of governmental liberalism in a state, was 43.5. As this index ranges from 0-
100, this indicates that the “middle” value in this data set was actually close the middle of 
this range. The value indicates that the median state trended more conservative, as a 
higher score on this index indicates greater liberalism. The lowest value in this variable 
was 0 and the highest value was 97.9, indicating that this variable does run the full range. 
The median value for the second variable in this group, beds per capita in a state, was 3.1, 
indicating that the “middle state” in the data set had approximately 3 hospital beds per 
1,000 population. The minimum value for this variable is 1.8 beds per capita, and the 
highest level of beds per capita was 7.0. The final variable in this group is state 
employees per capita. The median value for this variable was 172, indicating that the 
“middle state” in this data set had approximately 172 state employees per 100,000 
population. The minimum value in this data set was 103 and the maximum value was 
452. All three of these variables were positively skewed.  
 
Tests of Regression Assumptions 
Multicollinearity 
 
     Two tests were run to check for multicollinearity among the variables included in the 
effectiveness portion of the dissertation. First bivariate correlations were run to determine 
if any of the independent variables were correlated above the .8 threshold suggested in 
the methodology literature. None of the variables exceeded the .8 threshold, but two pairs 
of variables were found to be highly correlated with each other. The variables for the 
52 
 
percentage of a state’s population uninsured and the percentage of a state’s population in 
poverty were found to have a fairly high level of correlation (0.63). This is not 
unexpected, as the literature notes that a significant contributor to uninsurance in 
America is the inability to pay. The other high level of correlation was found between the 
variables for beds per capita in a state and the percentage of a state’s population 
composed of metropolitan areas (-0.53). This finding was also not surprising, as the 
literature notes that more urban areas tend to suffer from a lack of health care facilities 
due to closures necessitated by financial pressures. For more information, refer to Exhibit 
G in the Appendix.  
     As multicollinearity can seriously bias regression analysis, bivariate regressions were 
also conducted to test for this problem. While all the relationships were examined, 
particular attention was paid to those variables which were previously found to be highly 
correlated. The relationship between poverty and uninsurance was found to have an R 
Square of .40, which while not inconsiderable does not suggest that the relationship will 
unduly bias the relationship. The bivariate regression for the variables for beds per capita 
and percentage of a state composed of metropolitan areas was found to have a relatively 
low R Square of .27, indicating that this relationship will also not unduly bias the 
regression results. For more information, refer to Exhibit H in the Appendix.  
Test for Outliers/Heteroskedasticity 
     Due to the use of panel data in this study, a number of the available tests for outliers 
proved to be problematic. As a result, descriptive statistics were generated to search for 
outliers. While there was significant variation between states for some of the values, no 
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significant outliers were found within panels. Refer to Table 3-6 for the descriptive 
statistics.  
     The variation among the values for variables among states indicated that the data for 
the effectiveness study may violate the assumption of homoskedasticity, which the 
literature suggests is common for panel data. Using the STATA software, the Breusch-
Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was conducted and did find that the 
assumption of homoskedasticity was violated. As will be discussed later in the study, this 
problem was addressed through the use of a Prais-Winston transformation with panel-
corrected standard errors. For more information, refer to Exhibit C in the Appendix. 
Test for Normality/Linearity 
     Two additional regression assumptions that needed to be examined were the normal 
distribution of residuals and the linear distribution of residuals. A graph of the Kernel 
density estimate was generated using the STATA software and compared to the normal 
curve (refer to Exhibit D in the Appendix). Scatterplots for the residuals of the 
independent variables were generated to test for linearity. None of the scatterplots 
suggested that the linearity assumption had been violated, save for the scatterplots 
generated in regard to the dummy variables for the index of market-based expansion 
programs, the presence of SCHIP program, and the presence of the Medicaid program 
(refer to Exhibit E in the Appendix). A traditional assumption of regression analysis is 
that all the variables be measured at the interval level, which would be a prerequisite for 
linearity. However, more current methodology literature notes that nominal or ordinal 
data can be used in regression analysis provided certain conditions are met (Meier and 
Brudney, 2002). The use of the Prais-Winston regression and panel-corrected standard 
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errors should help to correct for any issues created by the use of the ordinal dummy 
variables.  
Test for Autocorrelation 
     A final regression assumption which needed to be examined in this analysis was that 
there is not autocorrelation of the residuals, either across panels or within panels. Using 
the STATA software, a Woolridge test was conducted to test for autocorrelation across 
panels. The results of this analysis indicate a lack of first-order autocorrelation (see 
Exhibit F). To test for autocorrelations within panels, a generalized least squares model 
was estimated. Despite the apparent lack of autocorrelation, Prais-Winston regression 
with panel-corrected standard errors will still be utilized due to the previously noted 
heteroskedasticity. The work of Beck and Katz (1995) suggests that even if there is no 
autocorrelation, the results of this analysis will still be accurate.  
     The preceding tests indicate that the data employed in this portion of the research does 
meet most of the traditional regression assumptions. The one issue that the data set seems 
to present is one of heteroskedasticity. As previously noted, this issue will be addressed 
using Prais-Winston regression with panel-corrected standard errors.  
 
Research Methodology 
 
     This portion of the dissertation utilizes a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression model 
with panel-corrected standard errors, a methodology most notably advocated by Beck and 
Katz (1995). Stimson (1985) noted that this type of pooled time series analysis could be 
very robust, “allowing the study of causal dynamics across multiple cases, where the 
potential cause may appear at different times in different cases” (p. 916). Incorporating 
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time and space into the model can also help to address numerous threats to validity. 
However, Stimson also notes that the use of pooled cross-sectional models also raises a 
number of statistical issues (Stimson, 1985).  
     Beck and Katz note that the nature of time series cross-sectional data (which looks at 
the different units at different points in time) makes the use of standard OLS difficult as 
OLS assumes “all the error processes have the same variance and all of the error 
processes are independent of each other” (p. 636). Specifically, the analysis could lead to 
correlated errors and problems of heteroscedasticity (p. 634). A form of generalized least 
squares developed by Parks (1967) was put forth as a way of addressing these issues, 
however Beck and Katz found that this method can seriously understate the variability in 
the sample.  
     In lieu of the Parks methods, Beck and Katz suggest using panel-corrected standard 
errors in place of OLS standard errors. Panel-corrected standard errors “pool information 
across clusters to estimate error variances” (Johnson, 2004, p. 3).  These panel-corrected 
standard errors allow for accurate analysis of either panel heteroscedasticity or 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms. This helps to correct the issue raised by 
Stimson (1985) that standard OLS will often treat cases in pooled data as independent of 
each other, even though they are in fact related. Studies conducted by Beck and Katz 
found that panel-corrected standard errors were accurate within 10% of the true 
variability in the sample, even with serious heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation (p. 641). Notably Beck and Katz found that where standard OLS standard 
errors did perform well, the PCSE’s still performed well, while PCSE’s were found to 
perform well in circumstances where OLS standard errors were not efficient. In regard to 
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the Parks GLS method, Beck and Katz found that PCSE’s were 2% more accurate than 
Parks standard errors. This form of analysis was used to control for heteroskedasticity in 
the data, as well as for autocorrelation of residuals within panels. Further, the standard 
errors are calculated independently for each panel.   
     Beck and Katz (1995) note that researchers using time series cross-sectional data 
should address temporal issues with the data through the use of lagged dependent 
variables or using a transformation procedure to eliminate serial correlation (p. 645). The 
effectiveness model employed in the dissertation utilizes the Prais-Winston 
transformation. This is a Generalized Least Squares estimator which is used in the 
presence of first order autocorrelation (although serious correlation between panels is not 
anticipated). In this process the first observation is transformed so that it does not have to 
be censored (Stata glossary, n.d.). Originally the Ochrane-Orcutt procedure was 
considered, but the literature indicates that the Cochrane-Orcutt method is problematic 
when the data includes lagged endogenous variables (Betancourt and Kelejian, 1981). In 
the presence of lagged variables, Ochrane-Orcutt can provide inaccurate information as 
the procedure eliminates the first case in the panel. As this research employs lagged 
dependent variables, Prais-Winston would be better in this situation as it uses all the 
observations in the sample, transforming the first data point in the panel to ensure 
homoskedastic standard errors (p. 218). Once this is done time series cross-sectional data 
can be analyzed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. This form of analysis 
will allow conclusions to be drawn about the effect of the market-based health insurance 
programs on the dependent variables while remaining cognizant of the fact that each state 
has unique characteristics which will impact the effectiveness. 
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Selection of Statistical Software 
Intercooled STATA 9 was utilized in the analyses of the effectiveness of market-based 
indicates that standard OLS regression will not be sufficient to generate an unbiased 
analysis. STATA offers more options for addressing this issue with the data, including 
the option which was ultimately utilized, Prais Winston regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors. In general, STATA offers numerous options for dealing specifically with 
panel data, whereas SPSS is limited in this area.     
   
Analysis 
Percentage of State Spending on Health Care 
 
     The first model focuses on the relationship between the market-based health care 
access expansion efforts and the percentage of state spending devoted to health care. In 
this model, the index of market-based state health expansion programs is not found to be 
significant at the .05 level.  
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care 
     The dummy variable for the presence of the State Children’s Health Insurance  
 
Program is also not found to be statistically significant in the analysis, along with the 
 
control variable for the percentage of union membership in a state. The variable 
 
controlling for the use of Medicaid 1115 waivers in the model is found to be statistically 
significant and in the negative direction, as hypothesized.  
Control Variables Which May Hinder The Effectiveness of Market-based Programs 
     The variable for the percentage of uninsured people in a state, the percentage of  
 
people in poverty, and the percentage of a state composed of metropolitan areas are found 
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to be statistically significant and positive in the analysis. All three of these findings  
 
indicate that these variables hinder the effectiveness of the market-based programs.   
 
 
Table 3-7: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Percentage of State Spending on Health Care1 
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
Market Index .204 .158 1.30 0.20 
Category 1     
SCHIP .016 .190 .0.08 0.93 
M1115 -.892 .222 -4.03 .000*** 
Union Members -.005 .016 -0.32 0.75 
 
Category 2     
Uninsured .081 .030 2.75 .006** 
Poverty .086 .033 2.62 .009** 
Unemployment -.015 .060 -0.25 0.810 
Metropolitan .028 .008 3.38 .001** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
-.002 .004 -0.61 0.54 
Hospital Beds .634 .166 3.81 .000*** 
State Employees .005 .002 2.68 .007** 
Constant 1.57 1.26 1.25 0.21 
 
 
 Interestingly, the control variable for the percentage of the unemployed in a state is not 
found to be statistically significant in the analysis. 
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of Market-based Programs 
     The variable for institutional ideology is not found to be statistically significant in the 
analysis, which indicates that the liberalism of state government did not affect the 
percentage of state spending devoted to health care.  
     Two of the control variables were found to be significant but not in the hypothesized 
direction. The control variable measuring the number of beds per 100,000 is found to be 
significant and in the positive direction. This runs counter to the hypothesis, which 
proposed that a stronger medical infrastructure in a state would translate into lower levels 
of health spending. Another control variable looking at employment, this one examining 
state employment per capita, is found to be statistically significant and positive in the 
model. As this variable is included as a proxy for the administrative capacity of state 
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government, it suggests that greater operational and regulatory capacity on the part of the 
state translates into higher state health spending. Both of these findings suggest not only 
that these variables do not help to facilitate the effectiveness of the market-based 
programs, but may actually hinder it.  
Mortality Per Capita 
 
     The variable for the index of market-based health expansion programs is found to be 
 
statistically significant and negative, indicating that the effort of states to expand access 
to health care through market-based programs helps to increase the overall level of health 
in a state, as evidenced by a lower mortality rate.  
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care 
     In this model, the dummy variable controlling for the presence of the SCHIP program 
is found to be statistically significant, though not in the hypothesized direction. 
According to the model, the presence of the children’s health program was positively 
related to mortality in the state, indicating that the presence of the program is associated 
with more deaths in a state. In this model, the dummy variable controlling for the use of 
Medicaid 1115 waivers and the variable for the percentage of a state’s population which 
are union members were not found to be statistically significant.  
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of the Market-based Health 
Programs 
     In the model examining the dependent variable of mortality in the state, the variable 
for the percentage of uninsured in a state is found to be statistically significant and 
negative, suggesting that having more uninsured people in a state decreases the death 
rate. Two other control variables, measuring the percentage of people in poverty and the 
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percentage of metropolitan area in the state, however, are statistically significant and in 
the hypothesized positive direction. A fourth socioeconomic variable, for the percentage 
of the unemployed in a state, is not found to be statistically significant.   
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of the Market-based Health 
Programs 
     Among this category of control variables, the variable measuring governmental 
liberalism is found to be statistically significant though not in the hypothesized direction. 
The analysis found that the presence of a more liberal state government is positively 
associated with mortality in the state. The variable for state employees per capita is also 
found to be significant, but in the hypothesized direction. The level of per capita state 
employment, which was included in the analysis as a proxy for state administrative 
capacity, is found to have a significant and negative relationship to mortality.   
 
Table 3-8: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Mortality per Capita1  
 Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>z 
Market Index -7.79 4.01 -1.94 0.052* 
Category 1     
SCHIP 13.43 4.77 2.82 0.005** 
M1115 9.10 5.19 1.75 0.080 
Union Members -.727 .420 -1.73 0.084 
Category 2     
Uninsured -1.82 .791 -2.30 0.02* 
Poverty 4.17 .819 5.09 0.000*** 
Unemployment -1.79 1.47 -1.22 0.22 
Metropolitan .759 .201 3.78 .000*** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.486 .086 5.64 0.000*** 
Hospital Beds 73.68 3.81 19.33 0.000*** 
State Employees -.729 .058 -12.60 .000*** 
Constant 676.19 29.65 22.80 0.000 
 
 
     The variable measuring the strength of the health infrastructure in a state, beds per 
capita, is found to be statistically significant in the analysis, though not in the 
hypothesized direction. The relationship between hospital beds per capita and the 
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morality level in a state is significant and positive, indicating a stronger health 
infrastructure is positively associated with higher levels of mortality.  
Gross State Product Per Capita 
 
     The following table provides the results of the regression analysis examining the 
relationship between the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools and the level of 
expenditures per patient in the state.  
 
Table 3-9: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Gross State Product Per Capita1 
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
Market Index 5.99           3.09 1.94 0.053* 
Category 1     
SCHIP 13.26 3.70 3.59 0.000*** 
M1115 .152 3.95 0.04 .969 
Union Members 1.98 .338 5.87 0.000*** 
Category 2     
Uninsured 1.49 .622 2.39 .017* 
Poverty 2.72 .607 4.48 .000*** 
Unemployment 2.18 1.09 2.00 0.045* 
Metropolitan 3.27 .161 20.27 .000*** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.054 .065 0.83 0.404 
Hospital Beds 17.27 2.76 6.26 .000*** 
State Employees -0.815 .048 -17.04 .000*** 
Constant -126.53 20.50 -6.17 0.000*** 
 
 
 
     The third model examines the relationship between the index of market-based state 
health programs and gross state product per capita. The market-based health program 
index variable is statistically significant and positive in this model, indicating that more 
effort put forth by states in terms of the adoption of state health expansion programs 
translates into economic benefits for the state as a whole. 
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care 
     The dummy variable controlling for the presence of the SCHIP program is found to be 
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statistically significant and positive in the model. This supports the hypothesis that the 
presence of the program to expand access to health care for uninsured children has 
positive economic effects for a state. The control variable for the percentage of a state’s 
population that is union members is also found to be statistically significant and in the 
hypothesized direction, indicating that a higher level of union members in a state benefits 
the people of a state economically. The dummy variable for the Medicaid 1115 waivers is 
not found to be statistically significant.  
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of Market-based Health 
Programs 
     The variables for the percentage of a state’s population that is uninsured and a state’s 
population that is in poverty are both found to be statistically significant, but not in the 
hypothesized direction. Both variables are found to have a positive relationship with 
gross state product, whereas they were hypothesized to have a negative relationship. The 
result for the variable for the percentage of unemployed people in the state is also 
difficult to explain. This variable is also statistically significant, but was also found not to 
be in the hypothesized direction. The final control variable in the analysis is the variable 
for the percentage of a state which is metropolitan in nature. This variable is found to be 
positive and statistically significant in the analysis, which was not as hypothesized but is 
not entirely counterintuitive as metropolitan areas tend to be transportation and 
manufacturing centers and thus generate economic activity.  
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs 
     The level of governmental liberalism was not found to have a significant relationship 
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with the gross state product of a state. The variable for beds per capita is significant and 
positive in the model, indicating that a stronger medical infrastructure in a state helps to 
foster better economic conditions, as hypothesized. The variable for the percentage of 
state employment is also found to be statistically significant in the analysis, but not in the 
hypothesized direction. The variable is found to have a negative relationship with gross 
state product, indicating that a higher level of state administrative capacity does not yield 
economic benefits for a state.   
Emergency Outpatients Treated 
 
 
Table 3-10: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Emergency Outpatients Treated1  
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
Market Index -11.35 3.59 -3.16 0.002** 
Category 1     
SCHIP 4.71 4.24           1.11 0.267 
M1115 5.26 5.18 5.18 .309 
Union Members -.569 .326 -1.74 0.081 
Category 2     
Uninsured -2.77 .687 -4.03 .000*** 
Poverty 3.15 .746 4.21 .000*** 
Unemployment 3.98 1.35 2.94 0.003** 
Metropolitan -.495 .195 -2.54 .011** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.140 .081 1.72 .086 
Hospital Beds 14.28 3.22 4.43 .000*** 
State Employees -.326 .059 -5.53 .000*** 
Constant 391.77 30.10 13.02 0.000 
 
 
     The variable for the index of market-based state health programs is found to have a 
significant and negative relationship to emergency outpatients treated, which indicates 
that market-based programs are effective in reducing reliance on emergency rooms.   
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care 
     The dummy variables controlling for the presence of the State Children’s Health 
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Insurance Program and Medicaid 1115 waivers are not found to be statistically significant 
in the analysis. Another variable related to health care access, the variable for the 
percentage of a state’s population that are members of unions, is found to be statistically 
significant in the analysis, and in this case negative. This supports the hypothesis that in 
states which are more heavily unionized people have greater access to preventative health 
coverage.  
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs 
     Two control variables in this category, percentage of people in poverty and percentage 
unemployed, are statistically significant and in the hypothesized (positive) direction. This 
indicates that having more people impoverished and more people on the unemployment 
rolls leads to more emergency room usage. One control variable which is statistically 
significant in the analysis (but not in the hypothesized direction) is the variable for the 
percentage of a state’s population which is uninsured. This variable is found to be 
negative in the analysis, which is counterintuitive since one would expect a higher 
percentage of uninsured people to translate into higher levels of emergency room usage. 
The final variable in the analysis, the percentage of a state composed of metropolitan 
areas, is also found to be statistically significant and negative in the analysis. This is 
rather counterintuitive, as it was hypothesized that a larger metropolitan area in a state 
would translate into higher levels of emergency room usage. 
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs 
     Institutional ideology is found not to be significant in the analysis, again indicating 
that the ideology of state government does not have a meaningful association with stress 
being placed on the medical infrastructure. The variable for state employees per capita is 
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found to be statistically significant and negative in the analysis, which supports the 
hypothesis that a state’s administrative capacity may facilitate a higher level of 
effectiveness in regards to the market-based health expansion programs. The variable for 
measuring a state’s medical capacity, beds per capita, is also found to be statistically 
significant in the analysis, although in this case not in the hypothesized direction. The 
analysis finds a positive relationship between hospital beds per capita and emergency 
room utilization.   
Expenditures per Patient 
     The final model in this portion of the study examines the role of market-based health 
expansion programs on hospital expenditures per patient. In this model, the variable for 
the index of market-based health expansion programs is not found to be significant. The 
finding for the market-based health program index in this model supports the finding in 
the model examining the percentage of state spending devoted to health care, indicating 
that these programs do not have a significant effect on the cost of providing health care.  
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care 
     One of the dummy variables controlling for the use of government-based health care, 
representing Medicaid 1115 waivers, is not found to be statistically significant in the 
analysis, which makes it unclear how, if at all, these programs affect hospital costs for 
treating patients. Interestingly, the variable controlling for the presence of the SCHIP 
program was found to be statistically significant, but not in the hypothesized direction. 
The presence of the SCHIP program was found to be significant and positive, indicating 
that the presence of the program is positively associated with an increase in expenditures 
per patient in the state.  
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   Table 3-11: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Expenditures per Capita 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
Market Index 5.52 6.34 0.87 0.384 
Category 1     
SCHIP 83.42 8.08 10.32 0.000*** 
M1115 5.10 8.50 0.60 .548 
Union Members 2.87 .715 4.02 0.000*** 
Category 2     
Uninsured -9.85 1.30 -7.57 .000*** 
Poverty           4.64 1.32 3.50 .000*** 
Unemployment 4.58 2.53 1.81 0.070 
Metropolitan 3.66 .316 11.55 .000*** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.849 .149 5.72 0.000*** 
Hospital Beds 91.81 6.75 13.61 .000*** 
State Employees -.029 .118 -0.25 .805 
Constant 316.63 52.88 5.99 0.000*** 
 
 
     The percentage of a state’s population that belongs to unions is also found to be 
significant in the analysis, though in the positive direction. This is counterintuitive, as it 
was hypothesized that higher levels of unionization would result in lower expenditures 
per patient due to greater access to health care.  
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs 
     The variable for the percentage of uninsured in a state is statistically significant in the 
analysis, although again not in the hypothesized direction. The analysis suggests that a 
higher level of uninsured people in a state translates into lower expenses per patient. The 
variable for the percentage of people in a state in poverty is also found to be statistically 
significant, but this time in the hypothesized, positive direction.  Another variable in the 
analysis, the percentage of a state which is composed of metropolitan areas, was found to 
be statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. The variable is found to have 
a positive relationship with expenditures per patient, indicating that such areas tend to 
experience higher health care costs. A final variable in this category was the variable for 
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the percentage of unemployed people in a state, which was not found to be statistically 
significant. 
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of Market-based Health 
Programs 
     The variable for institutional ideology is found to be statistically significant in this 
analysis, however it was found to have a positive relationship with expenditures per 
patient. This suggests that a more liberal government contributes to higher health care 
costs. Another variable related to capacity, hospital beds per capita, was also found to be 
statistically significant and positive in the analysis. The variable included to measure a 
state government’s administrative capacity, state employees per capita, was not found to 
be statistically significant in the analysis.  
 
Study of the Effectiveness of State High-Risk Health Insurance Pools 
 
     As this study is particularly interested in the role of state high-risk health insurance 
 
pools, a complementary analysis was conducted examining the effectiveness of the pools 
in regard to improving performance in state health care spending, overall health, 
economic productivity, and health infrastructure. These models seek to examine, not only 
the effects of the presence of the high-risk pools, but also the effects of the level of 
expansiveness of the programs in regard to their affordability. This market-based 
program is of particular interest as the high-risk pools are the most widely adopted 
programs at issue in this study.  
     One issue that has served to limit the effectiveness of high-risk pools is the fact that 
these programs charge premiums which can be set at levels considerably above average 
market value in the state (Achman and Chollet, 2001). In this portion of the study, the 
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high-risk health insurance pools, which vary significantly from state to state, were also 
indexed according to their maximum standard risk rate allowed by law (in essence the 
maximum percentage of the average insurance premium in the state which the risk pool is 
allowed to charge clients).  States that permit a lower SSR receive a higher score on the 
index, as the lower the SSR the more affordable the high-risk coverage is to purchase. 
Those states that have no maximum SSR rate received a 1 on the high-risk pool index, as 
there is no legal ceiling to how expensive the coverage may become. States with a 
maximum SSR of 250% received a 2, and those states with a maximum SSR of 200% 
received a 3. The states with a maximum SSR between 150-175% received a 4 on the 
index, with the most generous states, those with an SSR below 150%, receiving the 
highest score of 5 on the index.  
     The purpose of this study is to examine how the accessibility of a market-based health 
expansion program (in terms of its affordability) affects its ability to have a meaningful 
effect on indicators such as state health care spending, state mortality, gross state product, 
emergency patients treated, and expenditures per patient. The primary hypothesis of 
interest in this study is that the more affordable the high-risk pool is (in terms of having a 
lower maximum standard risk rate) the more effective the program will be. This is a 
particularly important hypothesis to test in regard to market-based health expansion 
efforts, as these programs are not designed, like Medicaid and SCHIP, to provide health 
care to those who have an inability to pay. This is especially true of high-risk pools, 
where clients are by design paying above the average market rate for coverage.  
     This study utilizes the same control variables as were used in the previous study of 
market-based expansion efforts. The hypotheses in regard to these variables are the same 
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as those in the previous study, as they are expected to have the same effects on the 
relationship between the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools and the 
dependent variables. The purpose of the study is to focus more narrowly on this one 
particular program, and to what degree it is effective in regard to improving the social 
and economic measures. 
     The high-risk pools are of special interest because, as noted previously, they represent 
a hybrid of government-based programs and market-based initiatives. The pools are 
created through legislative or regulatory action, but then largely function as a private firm 
would, charging premiums and placing certain limitations on coverage. In a number of 
states, legislators or other government officials may serve on the board overseeing the 
pools. The governor has statutory authority to appoint the members of the governing 
board in a number of states. However, representatives of private health insurance firms 
are often included on the boards as well (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007). A fair 
amount of research has been done in terms of examining high-risk pools regarding their 
viability for meaningfully expanding access to health care (Achman and Chollet, 2001; 
Abbe, 2002). However, as was the case for the other market-based health expansion 
programs, not much research attention has been devoted to the other potential 
developmental effects of these programs. This study makes an attempt to fill this gap.  
In the first model, examining the dependent variable of percentage of state general 
revenue devoted to health care, the primary independent variable of interest, the index 
measuring the presence and affordability of the high-risk pools, is found to be statistically 
significant. However, the variable does not perform in the hypothesized direction. The 
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variable is found to have positive relationship to the percentage of state health care 
spending. 
 
Table 3-12: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Percentage of State Spending on Health Care 
(High-Risk Pools)3  1 
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
HR Pool Index         .652 .104 6.30 0.000*** 
Category 1     
SCHIP -.102 .197 -0.52 0.605 
M1115 -1.02 .220 -4.62 0.000*** 
Union Members .005 .018 0.27 0.785 
Category 2     
Uninsured .092 .032 2.90 .004** 
Poverty           .113 .033 3.41 .001** 
Unemployment .014 .061 0.23 0.815 
Metropolitan .041 .009 4.74 .000*** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
-.002 .004 -0.52 0.60 
Hospital Beds .591 .172 3.44 .001** 
State Employees .006 .002 2.62 .009** 
Constant -.507 1.34 -0.38 0.705 
 
 
 
 
     In the second model in this study, looking at the dependent variable for mortality per 
capita in a state, the variable for the presence and affordability of the high-risk pools is 
found to be statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. This finding 
indicates that the state high-risk health insurance pools do show some success in 
improving overall state health, as evidenced by a reduction in mortality per capita. 
     The third analysis in this study looks at the effect of the high-risk pool index and other 
variables on the economic productivity of a state as measured by its gross state product. 
In this model, the variable for the presence and affordability of high-risk pools was found 
to be statistically significant, but not in the hypothesized direction. The results of this 
analysis actually indicate that the presence of more expansive high-risk pools has a 
negative relationship to gross state product.  
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      Table 3-13: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Mortality per Capita (High-Risk Pools) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
HR Pool Index         -9.07 2.87 -3.16 0.002** 
Category 1     
SCHIP 13.59 4.69 2.90 0.004** 
M1115 7.26 5.16 1.41 0.160 
Union Members -.545 .413 -1.32 0.186 
Category 2     
Uninsured -1.99 .780 -2.55 .011** 
Poverty           4.25 .805 5.28 .000*** 
Unemployment -1.58 1.46 -1.08 0.279 
Metropolitan .566 .203 2.79 .005** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.506 .085 5.98 0.000*** 
Hospital Beds 75.67 3.80 19.90 .000*** 
State Employees -.740 .057 -12.96 .000*** 
Constant 686.97 29.35 23.41 0.000*** 
 
   Table 3-14: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Gross State Product (High-Risk Pools) 
 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
HR Pool Index         -7.12 2.39 -2.98 0.003** 
Category 1     
SCHIP 14.66 3.78 3.87 0.000*** 
M1115 .627 4.14 0.15 0.88 
Union Members 1.65 .344 4.81 0.000*** 
Category 2     
Uninsured 1.20 .622 1.92 .055 
Poverty           2.53 .614 4.12 .000*** 
Unemployment 1.80 1.09 1.64 0.10 
Metropolitan 3.35 .173 19.43 .000*** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
-.009 .064 -.14 0.89 
Hospital Beds 16.74 2.99 5.60 .000*** 
State Employees -.838 .057 -14.65 .000*** 
Constant -95.42 23.30 -4.10 0.000*** 
 
 
     In the model examining the dependent variable of emergency outpatients treated, the 
variable for the presence and affordability of high-risk pools is statistically significant 
and in the hypothesized direction. This indicates that high-risk pools do have an effect in 
terms of reducing reliance on emergency room care, by providing people greater access 
to preventative medical care. This is a potentially very important finding, as reducing 
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reliance on emergency room care can serve to reduce financial pressures on hospitals, 
which can be beneficial to the health infrastructure in a state in a number of ways. 
The results of this analysis can be found in the table below.  
 
 
 
Table 3-15: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Emergency Outpatients Treated (High-Risk 
Pools) 4
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
HR Pool Index         -6.78 2.39 -2.84 0.005** 
Category 1     
SCHIP 3.57 4.15 0.86 0.39 
M1115 2.10 5.19 0.40 0.69 
Union Members -.475 .328 -1.45 0.147 
Category 2     
Uninsured -2.79 .674 -4.14 .000*** 
Poverty           2.84 .738 3.85 .000*** 
Unemployment 4.01 1.34 3.00 0.003** 
Metropolitan -.617 .205 -3.00 .003** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.148 .081 1.83 0.07 
Hospital Beds 12.16 3.08 3.95 .000*** 
State Employees -.349 .058 -6.01 .000*** 
Constant 411.35 30.52 13.48 0.000*** 
 
 
 
     In the final model, examining the effect of the presence and accessibility of high-risk  
 
pools, as well as other variables, on the expenditures per patient of hospitals in a state, the 
 
variable for the presence and accessibility of high-risk pools was found to be statistically 
significant and in the hypothesized direction. The analysis indicates that high-risk pools 
have a negative relationship to expenditures per capita, providing evidence that the 
programs serve to reduce the cost of treating people in a state.  
     Both the analyses focused on market-based programs in general and the high-risk 
pools in particular provide evidence that those market-based programs provide positive 
developmental social and economic effects. The next chapter will discuss the results 
regarding the effects of market-based programs and high-risk pools in greater depth, as 
well as examining the results of the control variables. This discussion will shed more 
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light on the effects of the programs on the dependent variables, as well as what effects the 
control variables have on the relationship between the indexes and the dependent 
variables. The results of the analysis for the final model examining the relationship 
between high-risk pools and expenditures per patient are below.    
 
 
Table 3-16: Regression Results for Expenditures per Patient (High-Risk Pools)5 
 Coefficient Std. Err.  Z P>z 
HR Pool Index         -13.76 4.77 -2.88 0.004** 
Category 1     
SCHIP 87.22 8.23 10.60 0.000*** 
M1115 -.514 8.67 -0.06 0.953 
Union Members 2.87 .706 4.07 0.000*** 
Category 2     
Uninsured -8.35 1.30 -6.40 .000*** 
Poverty           4.55 1.35 3.36 .001** 
Unemployment 5.09 2.51 2.03 0.042* 
Metropolitan 3.47 .332 10.46 .000*** 
Category 3     
Institutional 
Ideology 
.767 .148 5.19 0.000*** 
Hospital Beds 88.85 6.98 12.72 .000*** 
State Employees -.071 .123 -0.58 .563 
Constant 347.44 55.89 6.22 0.000*** 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS STUDY 
 
Market-based Health Program Index/High-Risk Pool Index 
 
Percentage of State Spending Devoted to Health Care 
 
     Looking at the relationship between the presence of market-based programs and the 
percentage of state spending devoted to health care, the analysis found that this 
relationship was not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that most of the 
programs included in the index do little to assist those individuals who would be eligible 
for assistance under government-based programs.  
     In regard to the relationship between the high-risk pool index and percentage of state 
health spending, the relationship was found to be statistically significant but not in the 
hypothesized direction. The results of the analysis indicate that the presence and 
expansiveness of a high-risk pool increases the percentage of state spending devoted to 
health care. This finding is not exactly counterintuitive, however, as high-risk pools do 
require some significant degree of state spending in the implementation of the pools and, 
in some states, for the operation of the pool. These pools also extend coverage to people 
who are likely to utilize frequent and extensive health care over the course of their life. 
These factors could result in higher, rather than lower, levels of state spending.  Other 
factors which may be contributing to this positive relationship may include limited 
disenrollment from the program, statutory limits on premiums which can be charged, and 
the fact that the pools regularly operate at a loss (Morrissey, 2008). In 2003, the 
premiums collected by high-risk pools covered only about 55-59% of operating expenses 
(Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2006 as cited by Morrissey, 2008).  
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Mortality per Capita 
 
     Focusing on the model examining the dependent variable of state mortality per capita, 
the index of market-based programs was found to have a statistically significant and 
negative relationship to the dependent variable.  This lends credence to the notion that 
greater access to health care through these programs translates into better health 
outcomes through greater access to preventative care and other health services.  
     The previous finding is supported by the finding regarding the relationship between 
the high-risk index and the dependent variable. This is logical, because, as previously 
noted, high-risk pools predominantly serve people who require considerable amounts of  
health care, without which chronic conditions could degenerate into catastrophic 
conditions. This finding would seem to indicate that the pools are successful in this goal, 
possibly through increasing access to preventative health care.   
Gross State Product 
 
     The findings concerning the relationships between the index of market-based 
programs/ high-risk pool index and the gross state product are conflicting. The analysis 
indicates that a greater presence of market-based programs in a state has a statistically 
significant and positive relationship to the gross product of a state. This lends support to 
the hypothesis that the presence of these programs benefit the economy of a state 
(Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007; Battistella and Kuder, 1993; Hall, 2000).     
     However, this economic benefit was not found in the analysis of the relationship 
between the high-risk pool index and the gross state product. In that model, the presence 
and expansiveness of high-risk pools was found to be significantly related to gross state 
product, but not in the hypothesized direction. This analysis suggests that high-risk pools 
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actually exert a drag on a state’s economy. One potential explanation for this finding in 
regard to high-risk pools is that part of the funding for the pools comes from assessments 
on private insurers, taxes on hospitals, and other charges which could be seen as drains 
on the economy of a state. This may also be a by-product of the losses incurred by the 
pools due to inadequate funding (Morrissey, 2008). More research should be conducted 
to examine economic gains versus economic losses in regard to high-risk pools.  
                                            Emergency Outpatients Treated 
 
     Examining the relationship between the presence of market-based health expansion 
programs and emergency room utilization, the presence of the market-based programs 
was found to significantly reduce emergency outpatients treated per capita in a state. This 
supports the hypothesis that these programs serve to improve access to preventative 
health care and reduce the need for uncompensated emergency room care. If these 
programs do have this effect, it suggests that they can play a significant role in reducing 
the pressures on hospital finances and resources created by the uninsured’s reliance on 
emergency room care. Reducing these pressures could serve to generate a number of 
other positive effects, which should be considered in future research. 
     The hypothesis that market-based programs can decrease dependence on emergency 
room care is also supported by the statistically significant and negative relationship 
between the high-risk pool index and emergency outpatients treated per capita. 
Individuals deemed to be high-risk and medically uninsurable by insurance companies 
may have no alternative but to seek extensive and expensive care in emergency rooms on 
a regular basis due to their lack of coverage. Therefore, extending coverage to such 
individuals through high-risk pools and allowing them to receive regular treatment would 
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be expected to take some of the pressure off of emergency rooms. This benefit to 
emergency rooms could have important positive effects for health care in a state in 
general. 
Expenditures per Capita 
     The benefits that hospitals gained from market-based programs in general in terms of 
emergency room usage do not seem to translate to hospital expenditures per patient. This 
indicates that these programs do not have a meaningful impact in terms of reducing 
hospitals’ costs for providing health care. This supports the finding for this variable in 
regard to the model looking at the percentage of state spending devoted to health care.  
     This may be due to the fact that these programs do allow those who have previously 
been denied access to health care to receive it, including certain high-risk individuals who 
may require extensive and expensive health care. One interesting finding from a study by 
Levit, et al (2003) was that increased hospital utilization between the years 2000 and 
2001 resulted in an increase in hospital labor costs in areas such as “nursing, 
pharmacology, imaging technology, and lab technology.” This resulted in growth of 
average hospital employee earnings in that year of 6.1 percent (Levit, et al, 2002). 
Research also indicates that preventative health care does not necessarily save money 
(Garson and Engelhard, 2008). If increases in utilization do have these kinds of effects on 
hospitals, then it stands to reason that programs to expand access to health care do not 
necessarily result in lower levels of health spending by states or hospitals.  
     Interestingly, the index measuring the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools 
was found to have a significant and negative relationship to expenditures per patient. This 
is interesting, as high-risk pools are intended to extend coverage to people who are most 
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in need of regular, extensive, and expensive health care. Thus, one could anticipate that 
allowing such individuals to have greater access to health care could increase 
expenditures. However, this finding supports the stated hypothesis that the presence and 
greater expansiveness of high-risk pools help to alleviate the level of expenditures by 
allowing people to take advantage of preventative care, which obviates the need for more 
expensive catastrophic care in the future. This lends some support to the hypothesis that 
extending access to preventative care to uninsured individuals, particularly those who are 
in serious need of medical care, can serve to prevent such individuals from requiring 
more extensive and expensive medical care in the future. It should also be noted that most 
high-risk pools include disease management programs, which helps to prevent chronic 
conditions from becoming catastrophic (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007).  
     In regard to the indexes of market-based health expansion programs and high-risk 
pools, the two indexes perform similarly in the models for two of the dependent 
variables. In the models measuring effects on mortality per capita and emergency 
outpatients treated per capita, the two indexes have negative relationships to the 
dependent variables. This indicates that both higher levels of overall state effort in regard 
to implementing market-based health expansion efforts and the effect of one type of 
market-based health expansion effort, the high-risk pool, were statistically significant in 
reducing mortalities and emergency room usage in a state.  
     The findings in regard to these independent variables, however, did differ in their 
performance in the other models. In the models examining the percentage of state 
spending devoted to health care, the index of market-based health expansion programs 
was not statistically significant, while the index of high-risk pools was found to be 
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statistically significant and positive in the analysis. However, in the case of high-risk 
pools there is some statistical evidence that the presence and level of expansiveness of 
these programs may drive up the cost of state health spending. While counter to the 
formally stated hypothesis, this finding is not counterintuitive. Some high-risk pools do 
require a portion of general revenue funds to finance the deficit created by the fact that 
premiums taken in are not equal to the medical costs incurred by program clients (Howitt, 
2008). 
Control Variables that Expand Access to Health Care 
      Looking at the first category of control variables, which, like the market-based 
programs, may expand access to health care, there is some evidence that the SCHIP and 
Medicaid 1115 programs may contribute to the provision of general social and economic 
benefits. Looking at the dependent variable for state spending, there is statistical evidence 
that the Medicaid 1115 waivers are contributing to lower state spending in both the 
market-based and high-risk pool models. The variable controlling for the presence of the 
SCHIP program and the variable for the percentage of a state’s population that belong to 
unions were found to positively contribute to economic productivity in a state. However, 
the other relationships in this category of control variables were found not to be 
significant or the relationships were not in the hypothesized direction. Future research 
should focus on the degree to which federally-based programs are successful in providing 
general benefits to the people of a state, as well as the degree to which unions are still a 
powerful actor in the health care area.  
     The table below summarizes the statistical results for the analysis examining the 
relationship between market-based programs and the dependent variables.  
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   Table 4-1: Summary of Effectiveness Results1
 
 State 
Spending on 
Health Care 
Mortality per 
Capita 
Gross State 
Product 
Emergency 
Outpatients  
Treated 
Expenditures 
per Patient 
Market-Based 
Index 
Not 
Significant 
Negative (H) Positive (H) Negative (H) Not Significant 
Category 1 
Controls 
     
SCHIP Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) Positive (H) Not Significant Positive (NH) 
Medicaid 1115 Negative (H) Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not Significant Not Significant 
Unionization Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (H) Not Significant Positive (NH) 
Category 2 
Controls 
     
Uninsured Positive (H) Negative (NH) Positive (NH) Negative (NH) Negative (NH) 
Poverty Positive (H) Positive (H) Positive (NH) Positive (H) Positive (H) 
Unemployment Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) Positive (H) Not Significant 
Metropolitan Positive (H) Positive (H) Positive (NH) Negative (NH) Positive (H) 
Category 3 
Controls 
     
Beds Per Capita Positive (NH) Positive (NH) Positive (H) Positive (NH) Positive (NH) 
State Employment 
per Capita 
Positive (NH) Negative (H) Negative 
(NH) 
Negative (H) Not Significant 
Institutional 
Ideology 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) Not 
Significant 
Not Significant Positive (NH) 
 
 
 
Control Variables That May Hinder the Effectiveness of Market-based Programs 
 
     Looking at the control variables which may constrain access to health care and thus 
make it more difficult for the market-based health insurance programs to provide  general 
economic and social benefits to the population of a state, the variable for the percent 
uninsured was found to be significant and positive in relation to state spending, providing 
evidence that a higher level of uninsurance in a state can increase state spending on 
health care. The variable for the percentage of a state’s population in poverty was found 
to have a statistically significant relationship with four of the dependent variables, and all 
of these relationships were in the hypothesized direction. The poverty variable was found 
to have a significant and positive relationship with state spending on health, mortality per 
capita, emergency outpatients treated, and expenditures per patient. These findings 
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indicate that poverty is a powerful societal force in a state and does appear to stand in 
opposition to the ability of market-based health expansion programs and other such 
efforts to deliver economic and social benefits. The control variable for the percentage of 
unemployed people in a state was found to have a significant and positive relationship to 
emergency room utilization, and the variable for the percentage of metropolitan area in a 
state was related to increases in state health care spending, mortality, and expenditures 
per patient. While the relationships between these control variables and the dependent 
variables were mixed, there is some convincing evidence that these variables may 
constrain the benefits of any health expansion program, including market-based 
programs.  
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Creation of Benefits through Improved 
Program Implementation 
     The control variables expected to create the conditions that would better permit 
programs such as the market-based programs to deliver social and economic benefits 
performed most counterintuitively. This was particularly true of the variable for hospital 
beds per capita in a state, which was included in the analysis as a measure of state 
medical infrastructure. This variable was found to have statistically significant and 
positive relationships with state health spending, mortality per capita, emergency 
outpatients treated, and expenditures per capita. It was hypothesized that a stronger health 
infrastructure would be effective in alleviating these problems, acting in conjunction with 
programs such as the market-based health expansion programs. Most of the findings 
suggest the opposite, although the relationship between hospital beds per capita and gross 
state product was as hypothesized, indicating that stronger medical infrastructure does 
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contribute to better economic productivity. The variable for state employment per capita 
(included in the analysis as a measure of state administrative capacity) performs more in 
line with the hypotheses, however, it still had counterintuitive relationships with the 
percentage of state spending on health care (positive) and gross state productive 
(negative). However, the results do indicate state administrative capacity does facilitate 
the creation of social and economic benefits by reducing mortality per capita and 
emergency outpatients treated. A third variable in this category, the variable for 
government liberalism, was not statistically significant in its relationship to three of the 
dependent variables. In the relationships where the institutional ideology variable was 
significant (mortality per capita and expenditures per capita) the results were positive as 
opposed to negative. Taken as a whole, these variables do not appear to be effective in 
facilitating the sort of social and economic benefits discussed in this research. These 
variables are most in need of careful study.   
     The preceding analyses indicate that market-based health expansion programs can be 
successful in providing general economic and societal benefits to a state, such as reducing 
overall mortality, boosting economic productivity, and reducing reliance on emergency 
room usage. However, the adoption of these programs throughout the United States has 
been relatively limited. As suggested by previous research and the events of the national 
health reform debate of 2009, there are significant partisan and ideological differences of 
opinion in regard to how to best expand access to health care. Liberal Democrats 
advocate a plan which includes a federally-administered insurance program, while 
conservative Republicans argue for reforms in the existing private insurance system.  
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   Table 4-2: Summary of Effectiveness Results
 
 State Spending 
on Health Care 
Mortality per 
Capita 
Gross State 
Product 
Emergency 
Outpatients  
Treated 
Expenditures 
per Patient 
High-Risk Pool 
Index 
Positive (NH) Negative (H) Negative (NH) Negative (H) Negative (H) 
Category 1 
Controls 
     
SCHIP Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) Positive (H) Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) 
Medicaid 1115 Negative (H) Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Unionization Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (H) Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) 
Category 2 
Controls 
     
Uninsured Positive (H) Negative (NH) Not 
Significant 
Negative (NH) Negative (NH) 
Poverty Positive (H) Positive (H) Positive (NH) Positive (H) Positive (H) 
Unemployment Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (H) Positive (H) 
Metropolitan Positive (H) Positive (H) Positive (NH) Negative (NH) Positive (H) 
Category 3 
Controls 
     
Beds Per Capita Positive (NH) Positive (NH) Positive (H) Positive (NH) Positive (NH) 
State Employment 
per Capita 
Positive (NH) Negative (H) Negative (NH) Negative (H) Not 
Significant 
Institutional 
Ideology 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Positive (NH) 
 
 
 
     However, these divisions may not be as cut and dried as they appear at first glance. 
After all, it was a Democratic Sen. Kent Conrad of South Dakota, who proposed the idea 
of regional non-profit cooperatives which people could buy into in order to purchase 
insurance as an alternative to the federally-operated program put forth by the Obama 
administration. In fact, a number of conservative Democrats, or “blue dogs,” were critical 
of the Obama administration’s public option to allow people to receive coverage directly 
from the federal government. Also, the opening example of the TennCare and Cover 
Tennessee programs illustrated how a Democratic governor transitioned from a broader, 
government-based program to a more narrowly focused market-based approach. This is 
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indicative that the environment in which health care policy is made is increasingly 
complex politically, with some Democrats advocating for what would conventionally be 
considered a conservative approach to health care expansion. Given the results of the 
previous analyses, perhaps these Democrats, like Governor Bredesen of Tennessee, have 
come to view market-based reforms as a meaningful alternative to the government-based 
programs they may find difficult to sell to their constituents. In the next chapter, this 
dissertation will examine the role of Democratic control of the state legislature and 
citizen ideology, in addition to other political and societal variables, in the adoption of 
market-based programs. This study will examine the commonly held position that the 
degree to which market-based reforms can gain traction is determined by the ideological 
nature of the states and partisan makeup of the legislature.  
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CHAPTER 4 
                                   ADOPTION OF MARKET-BASED STATE 
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 
Introduction 
 
     During the 1990’s and early 2000’s states adopted a number of incremental, market-
based programs to address the growing problem of the uninsured, including high-risk 
pools, reinsurance programs, limited benefit plans, group purchasing arrangements, and 
HIFA waivers. Based on the results presented in Chapters Three and Four, these 
programs have been effective in producing general socioeconomic benefits for a state, yet 
they have not been as widely adopted throughout the United States as more government-
based programs such as the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan. Part of this could be 
attributed to the fact that many of the programs under consideration were only 
implemented in the wake of the failure of the Clinton health care plan, so there has been a 
relatively limited amount of time for the knowledge of the program’s effects to spread. 
Another factor, as noted in Chapter Three, is that the evaluations of the market-based 
programs to this point have been focused on relatively narrow outputs. However, as 
evidenced by the significant body of policy adoption literature, there are many factors at 
the state level which affect whether or not states choose to adopt different programs. It is 
anticipated that a stronger understanding of the factors which lead to the adoption of 
market-based health insurance programs would help to understand the nature of the 
programs and the socioeconomic effects they create at the state-level. For example, 
looking at the citizen ideology covariate included in the adoption model, finding that 
market-based health insurance programs are more favored by liberal or conservative 
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policymakers could influence the way we interpret the programs’ results in areas such as 
state spending, mortality, gross state product, emergency outpatients treated, and 
expenditures per patient.      
     This chapter examines the political, economic, and social factors which contribute to 
the adoption of market-based health expansion programs. The primary hypothesis for this 
model is that states with a more liberal citizen ideology and a higher percentage of 
Democratic lawmakers are less likely to adopt state high-risk health insurance pools and 
other market-based health expansion programs.  
     This issue is again raised by the experience of the TennCare and Cover Tennessee 
programs. The TennCare program, an effort toward universal health care within the 
boundaries of Tennessee, was enacted by Democratic governor Ned McWhirter. This is 
not surprising as traditionally Democratic policy makers have been more supportive of 
government-based efforts to expand access to health care, such as Medicaid, Medicare, 
and SCHIP. However, it must also be noted that it was also a Democratic governor, Phil 
Bredesen, who sacrificed efforts to preserve TennCare as a broad-based health care 
program in order to enact the more narrowly focused, market-based Cover Tennessee 
program. This disconnect between the commonly accepted health policy paradigm (i.e. 
Democrats favor more broad-based government programs) was also seen in the 2009 
congressional debate over the health reform plan proposed by the Obama administration. 
During the course of this debate, numerous more fiscally conservative members of the 
Democratic party raised serious concerns about the proposed national health care plan. 
Particular concern was focused on the notion of the public option, a federally-operated 
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alternative to private health insurance, with many Democrats expressing skepticism or 
outright opposition.    
     All of this highlights the complicated relationships between ideology, partisanship, 
and health care policy. It should be noted that the role of ideology in the adoption of 
market-based programs can be particularly complicated due to the nature of the 
programs. Market-based health program utilize the private market rather than relying on 
the expansion of government-based care, however these programs are still intended to 
expand access to health care which is a traditionally liberal policy goal. In this chapter, 
the influence of ideology, partisanship and other political and socioeconomic factors on 
the adoption of market-based state health access expansion programs will be analyzed 
using a Cox proportional hazard model. This analysis will hopefully shed additional light 
on the counterintuitive findings regarding the institutional ideology variable in the 
previous analysis, as well as provide some statistical context for the previous example of 
the TennCare/Cover Tennessee program.  
 
Model Development 
 
     Throughout recent U.S. history, expanding access to health care, particularly for the 
poor or underprivileged, has been a cause championed by liberal Democrats (Weissert 
and Weissert, 2006). However, recent scholarship in the area of health care, including a 
paper by Barrilleaux and Brace (2007), note that recent efforts to expand health care have 
employed not only traditional government programs but also efforts to utilize market-
based methods. When it comes to the adoption of those programs that encourage taking 
advantage of the private market, they may not be championed by liberals, but rather by 
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conservatives who see such programs as being good for businesses, particularly small 
businesses. This study seeks to evaluate the role of partisanship and ideology in the 
adoption of market-based state health programs, controlling for a number of political 
independent variables. The model also seeks to control for social and need-based 
variables, such as the percentage of citizens in a state without health insurance, the 
percentage of minorities in the state, the percentage of small businesses offering coverage 
to employees, and the percentage of people in the state who are members of unions.        
 
Literature on the Effects of Ideology and Party Affiliation on Policy Development 
     Ideology has been found to play a significant role in problem definition and agenda-
setting (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). Ideology frequently acts as a cue to help 
legislators and members of the general public decide the degree to which government 
action is necessary and acceptable. A number of researchers note that liberal politicians 
would be expected to support reforms in the area of health care involving more 
government activity (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993 as cited in Barrilleaux and 
Brace, 2007). However, the previously cited story of the government-based and market-
based health reforms in Tennessee demonstrate that the relationships between ideology, 
party affiliation, and policy development are not always clear. This study seeks to build 
upon this literature by investigating the degree to which ideology affects the adoption of 
market-based health care expansion programs, utilizing the citizen ideology measure 
developed by Berry, et al, (1998).   
     It should be noted that the literature is mixed in terms of the role of ideology in state 
public policy. Some studies do reinforce the idea that state legislators will adopt policies 
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based on traditional liberal or conservative ideologies, with more liberal legislators 
supporting more liberal public policy and vice versa. Entman (1983) evaluated how the 
personal ideologies of legislators in Connecticut and North Carolina affected their role-
call voting. Entman noted that previous research indicated that the impact of ideology is 
blunted by the electoral process or socialization of constituents to focus on factors other 
than voting records when evaluating incumbents. This research suggests that legislators 
may have a certain amount of leeway to incorporate their own preferences into voting 
decisions. To investigate the degree to which this is true, Entman used a questionnaire to 
gauge where legislators in the two states fit on the “liberal-conservative” continuum. 
Constituent ideological preferences are controlled for using district-level measures of 
electoral support for Democratic candidates.  
     The dependent variable for the study was the percentage of times legislators cast 
liberal votes (as defined by interest group ratings). In the results for both North Carolina 
and Connecticut, legislator ideology was found to have a statistically significant effect. 
However, it should be noted that in the case of Connecticut, political party accounted for 
much of the variation in roll-call voting. In North Carolina, party accounted for virtually 
none of the variance, while ideology accounted for 20-25% of the variance in roll-call 
voting. In North Carolina, it was found that more concrete policy beliefs have a greater 
impact than philosophical ideology. However, in Connecticut, ideology was more of an 
influence than policy stance. Entman found little evidence that constituent attitudes affect 
legislator ideology, although ideology seems to largely be a function of party. In regard to 
North Carolina, ideology seems to be largely a product of income and urbanization. 
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Ultimately Entman concludes that “economic development, party competition, and elite 
ideological liberalism seem to reinforce policy decisions” (p. 178). 
     Barrilleaux and Miller (1988) investigated the link between liberalism and state 
Medicaid spending. Ideology was measured in the study using ADA ratings of a states’ 
congressional delegation. They found that Medicaid spending as a proportion of state 
personal income grew by .17% with each percentage increase in liberalism (Barrilleaux 
and Miller, 1988, p.1098). Berry and Berry (1992) investigated factors which influenced 
adoption of taxes during the twentieth century, including whether or not the state was 
controlled by a liberal party. Their analysis did indicate that between 1919 and 1939, 
states under complete liberal control with centralized values in other areas were much 
more likely to adopt an income tax, as opposed to a state under heavy conservative 
control.  
     Meier and McFarlane (1993) used two different ideology measures, looking at 
conservatism and liberalism to investigate the impact of institutional liberalism on 
funding for abortion. The authors used the Holbrook (1984) measure of conservatism 
(sum of coalition scores) and the New Deal liberalism score created by Rosenstone 
(economic liberalism) (1983). Meier and McFarlane hypothesized that more conservative 
states would have lower levels of funding for abortion, while more liberal states would 
have higher funding levels. New Deal liberalism was found to have a statistically 
significant and negative effect on abortion funding at the state level, which provides 
evidence that economic liberals are not necessarily sympathetic to the positions of social 
liberals on issues like abortion. Grogan (1994) used measures of political culture and 
political party control to measure the effect of ideology on state Medicaid spending. 
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While Grogan hypothesized that the legislators’ ideological preferences would be 
constrained by the size of their constituency and pressure from interest groups, she found 
that ideology was statistically significant and negative for all three dimensions of 
Medicaid spending (categorical eligibility, financial eligibility, and benefit coverage). 
While Grogan initially hypothesized that the ideology measures (which were valued 
higher with higher levels of conservatism) would only be significant in the model 
examining categorical eligibility, she found that state politicians have more ability to 
satisfy their ideological preferences, and revised her model to emphasize the importance 
of ideology in all three models.  
     Brown (1995) investigated the influence of state party control on state welfare 
benefits. The study is particularly interested in the role played by coalitions within 
political parties, and the relative importance of the different groups making up those 
coalitions. In conducting this research, Brown controls for the liberalism of state party 
elites using the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure of ideology. Brown 
hypothesized that greater party elite liberalism will lead to more generosity in social 
welfare benefits. The results of Brown’s pooled cross-sectional (panel) analysis found 
that elite liberalism had the expected relationship with social welfare benefits. Welfare 
effort was greater in the presence of greater elite liberalism. Shipan and Volden (2006) 
hypothesized that liberal governments which are more favorable toward activist policy 
will be more likely to enact stricter restrictions on smoking. In their analysis, Shipan and 
Volden did find that states with higher levels of liberal ideology are more likely to enact 
smoking restrictions.  
92 
 
     It is important to note, however, that a number of studies suggest that ideology is not 
always a significant factor in policy adoption. One study conducted by Plotnick and 
Winters (1985) sought to combine economic and political models explaining support for 
income redistribution. In their model they used two different indicators of liberalism: the 
Americans for Democratic Action index and AFL-CIO’s index of House and Senate 
voting records. In their analysis, the authors found the link between liberal party control 
and redistribution to be insignificant. Plotnick and Winters suggest that this variable’s 
influence is only felt through its interaction with other variables.       
     It should be noted that the variable for institutional ideology included in the previous 
study was not found to be statistically significant in three of the analyses, and in the 
analyses where the variable did prove to be significant it was not in the hypothesized 
direction. The variable for institutional ideology was found to be statistically significant 
and positive in regard to mortality per capita and expenditures per patient, which 
indicates that a greater level of liberalism in the state legislature actually works in 
opposition to the socioeconomic benefits market-based health insurance programs can 
create. 
     In addition to evaluating the role of the ideology of government, studies have also 
examined the influence of citizen ideology. The results have been mixed. Some analyses 
found that the ideology of the citizenry is not significantly related to state policy 
priorities. Jacoby and Schneider (2003) suggest this is because the general public does 
not look at different policies as liberal or conservative, thus state governments do not 
enact policy based on the ideological nature of the general public. Public opinion is 
instead evaluated based on political party affiliation. Appelbaum (2001) used two studies 
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to examine two questions regarding decisions on programs to aid the poor. The first 
question is to what degree public perception of the deservingness of a group affects 
public support for providing aid to the group. The second question is how support for aid 
is affected by people’s perception of the level of fault that the needy group bears for their 
current position. Political ideology is included as a moderating variable in these two 
studies, drawing on prior research which indicated that people with a more conservative 
ideology felt the poor were not deserving of help. The results of OLS regression found, 
irrespective of whether the recipients were seen as deserving or not, liberals were more 
likely to recommend the provision of liberal policies. However, respondents were found 
to be more likely to recommend providing liberal policies when the group at issue was 
considered more deserving. In the second study, liberals were once again found more 
inclined than conservatives to recommend more liberal policies, whether an individual’s 
social situation is viewed more as their own individual fault, society’s fault, or the fault 
of the culture. Ideology was also strongly connected to the decision not to provide any 
benefits, with conservatives much more likely to recommend this than liberals 
(Appelbaum, 2001).  
     Kousser (2002) used the McIver, et al. measure of public ideology to investigate the 
effect of the public’s political leanings on state Medicaid spending. Kousser hypothesized 
that ideology would not have a significant effect due to lack of public salience. This 
hypothesis was confirmed by a cross-sectional regression analysis which did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between the ideology measure and Medicaid 
spending. Sapat (2004) investigated previous findings that more liberal states enact more 
pro-environment regulation using the McIver, et al measure. In Sapat’s probit model, the 
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variable for public opinion liberalism was not found to be statistically significant. Sapat 
suggests that this is due to the fact that administrative agencies are more insulated from 
interest group influence than politicians. 
     Rudolph and Evans (2005) found that ideology moderates the effect of political trust 
on public support for government spending, both in distributive and redistributive 
programs. Previous research has suggested that ideology is a powerful influence on 
people’s attitudes toward government spending. Based on previous findings, Rudolph and 
Evans hypothesized that liberals will be more supportive of increased distributive and 
redistributive spending. The authors used Herington’s sacrifice-based theory of political 
trust, which argues that political trust is activated when individuals are asked to sacrifice 
their own material self-interest or ideological principle for others. To test the effects of 
ideology, the researchers use a five point scale, from 1 (very conservative) to 5(very 
liberal). The researchers found a statistically significant interaction between political trust 
and conservatism, indicating that ideology moderates support for both distributive and 
redistributive policies. Political trust failed to increase liberals’ support for distributive 
policy, but increased liberals’ support for some redistributive programs (but not others). 
The results indicate that political trust is more influential among conservatives as 
opposed to liberals. The authors note that the influence of political trust in increasing 
support for distributive and redistributive spending is evidence that trust can help to 
overcome ideology.   
     These two significant findings raise a number of issues regarding traditional 
hypotheses about ideology and health care. Hays (1996) hypothesized that states with 
strong ideological or political support for adoption of a new law will adopt the law in a 
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more comprehensive fashion and those with strong opposition to the law would adopt 
less comprehensively, if at all. Traditionally, increasing access to health care has been a 
policy priority of liberals, so it was hypothesized in the effectiveness study that a higher 
level of liberal ideology would result in improved health care outcomes. However, the 
statistical analyses would seem to indicate the opposite, that in fact the presence of 
stronger liberal ideology either did not make a difference in the results or worked against 
the creation of the hypothesized outcomes. It should be noted that most of the market-
based programs considered in this study became prevalent in the United States following 
the failure of the Clinton health plan, when the states had to take greater responsibility for 
expanding health care access. Therefore one could argue that information regarding the 
effectiveness of these programs has not had sufficient time to disseminate across the 
country. However, at least one of the market-based programs under consideration, state 
high-risk health insurance pools, has been present in the U.S. since the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s. Therefore, one would presume that this program has been in existence long 
enough for states to have gathered sufficient information to evaluate whether or not they 
are worth implementing in their own state. If that is the case, there must be other 
variables differentiating adopting from non-adopting states. While other variables 
measuring political factors and problem severity are included in the analyses, based on 
previous adoption research and the findings of the effectiveness study, the adoption study 
to follow will be particularly focused on the relationship between partisanship, ideology 
and the adoption of both market-based programs in general and high-risk pools 
specifically.      
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     Getting a better sense of the what role ideology plays in both the effectiveness and 
adoption of these market-based health expansion efforts stands to improve our 
understanding of policy in the U.S. states in a number of ways. Debates over the efficacy 
of policy in academic research, the popular media, and in general conversation are 
frequently viewed through the prism of conservatism versus liberalism. The debate over 
the Obama administration’s health care plan in 2009 often assumed the traditional 
narrative of liberals in favor of government intervention on one side and conservative 
opponents of such intervention on the other. However, to characterize the Obama plan as 
merely a “big government” plan is to ignore the aspects of the plan promoting the 
expansion of employer-based insurance and other aspects of the private market.  
     Similarly, characterizing the market-based programs along liberal versus conservative 
lines ignores their ideological complexity, indeed the growing ideological complexity of 
American public policy in general. Students of public policy must acknowledge that as 
problems such as lack of access to health care have continued to grow, policy makers 
have been forced to become less reliant on old policy paradigms and look to new ones 
such as governing by network. Rethemeyer and Hatmaker (2007), in their discussion of 
policy networks, note that less bureaucratically centralized government grew out of 
trends which included a decline in the power of political parties.  Examining whether 
ideology has a clear influence on the adoption of these market-based health insurance 
expansion programs will allow us to get a better sense of what to degree these old 
ideological regimes are being broken down.   
     Along with ideology, party affiliation has been found to be an important factor in 
determining people’s views on government-based versus market-based programs. 
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Republicans have traditionally opposed government intervention in solving domestic 
social problems, preferring that the market be utilized to address such problems. 
Democrats on the other hand are much more inclined to distrust the ability of the market 
to address problems and reject market-based solutions in favor of government-based 
programs (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). Jacoby and Schneider (2003) actually found 
that party affiliation was a better predictor of what policies will be enacted in a state, as 
the general public does not tend to evaluate policies according to ideology and thus 
politicians do not tend to support policies based on where they fit on the traditional 
conservative-liberal perspective. Hwang and Gray (1990) examined the role of party 
control on education policy and found that Democratic Party control did not have a 
significant impact due to the bipartisan nature of education, although the level of voter 
participation in the state was found to be significant. To evaluate the influence of party 
affiliation on the adoption of market-based programs, this study includes a variable 
measuring the percentage of state legislators belonging to the Democratic party. This data 
was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract.    
     This chapter of the dissertation will be primarily concerned with the role of party 
affiliation (particularly Democratic control of the state legislature) and the level of liberal 
ideology held by the state’s population in the adoption of market-based programs. 
However, this analysis will also employ a number of covariates to control for other 
factors which could have a significant influence on adoption. Control covariates related 
to the political character of a state include the level of political competition, the influence 
of Southern as opposed to non-Southern states, and the level of lobbyist activity in a state 
as it relates to health care. The model also includes covariates to account for the role of 
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the need for health expansion programs in the state. These covariates include: the 
percentage of small businesses providing coverage to their employees, the percentage of 
minorities in a state, the percentage of the state’s population belonging to unions, and a 
gross measure of the percentage of a state’s population which is uninsured.    
 
Research Questions 
 
     This chapter examines the influence of political and socioeconomic variables on the 
adoption of market-based health insurance expansion programs. The primary research 
questions at issue in this chapter of the dissertation are:  
1. What is the effect of Democratic Party control of the state legislature on the 
adoption of market-based health expansion programs? 
2. What is the effect of liberal citizen ideology on the adoption of market-based 
health expansion programs? 
 
This model will also address questions in regard to the control variables: 
 
3. What is the effect of political competition on the adoption of market-based health 
expansion programs? 
4. What is the effect of Southern politics on the adoption of market-based health 
expansion programs?  
5. What is the effect of a stronger lobbyist presence related to health care in a state 
on the adoption of market-based health expansion programs? 
6. What is the effect of the racial composition of a state on the adoption of market-
based health expansion programs? 
7. What is the effect of a higher level of small businesses providing insurance 
coverage on the adoption of market-based health expansion programs? 
8. What is the effect of the level of union membership on the adoption of market- 
based health expansion programs? 
9. What is the effect of a higher percentage of uninsured people in a state on the 
adoption of market-based health expansion programs? 
 
 
Research Design 
 
     The adoption chapter utilizes a Cox proportional hazard model. This is a form of event 
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history analysis, in which we study “how the duration spent in one social state affects the 
probability some entity will make a transition to another social state” (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones, 1997, p. 1414). Box-Steffensmeier and Jones note that hazard modeling is 
preferable to regression methods because traditional regression methods fail to 
adequately differentiate between states when investigating a process taking place over 
time (such as policy adoption). They argue that this is due to the fact that the effect of the 
duration between the start point and adoption is not adequately taken into account (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997).  
     Event history analysis seeks to do just that, and is proposed as an alternative to cross-
sectional analysis (which cannot model a process over time) and panel design (which 
could provide inaccurate impressions about how a change takes place). The first key 
concept in regards to event history analysis is the survivor function, which looks at the 
probability that the event of interest has survived beyond the end of the measured time 
period (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). In the case of the dissertation study, the 
survivor function is examining the probability that a state has not enacted an event by the 
end of the time period of interest (1989-2003). The second concept which is important to 
event history analysis is the occurrence of the event of interest, in this case the adoption 
of one of the market-based health expansion programs. The third key concept in regards 
to event history analysis is the hazard rate, which according to Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones (1997) “reflects the rate at which a duration or episode ends in the interval” 
considering it did not previously terminate” (p. 1419). Put another way, the hazard rate 
reflects the risk of an event occurring given it has not happened already.  
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     In order, to assess the hazard rate, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) note the 
importance of selecting an appropriate starting point. For the purposes of this study, the 
starting point selected was 1989, as the 1990’s were a decade of significant state-level 
action in the area of health care, spurred in part by the development and defeat of the 
Clinton plan (Sparer, 2004). The authors note that it is also very important that the 
dependent variable be appropriately formatted. Often the dependent variable is formatted 
as a binary variable (0 if a change has not occurred, 1 if it has occurred). The dependent 
variable can also be a continuous variable measuring the amount of time that elapses 
before a change (Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). The form of event history used in this 
analysis, the Cox proportional hazard model, utilizes a binary dependent variable, 
however the model is specified with a duration measure to account for the effect of time.  
     The Cox model is one of several proportional hazard models which seeks to measure 
the hazard rate while addressing the issue of time dependency in such a way that it does 
not unduly bias the results. According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997), the 
proportional hazard “refers to the effect of any covariant having a proportional and 
constant effect” which is not influenced by time (p. 1433). As time is already accounted 
for in the Duration measure, one wants to make sure that the influence of the covariates 
included in the model is not also owing to the passage of time. To interpret the hazard 
rate for each covariate (as reported by STATA), one subtracts 1 from the hazard rate. For 
instance, suppose that STATA reports a hazard rate of .93 for one of the covariates. You 
would subtract .93 from 1 to get -.07. This indicates that this covariate decreases the 
chance of adoption by approximately 7%. However, if a hazard rate of 1.14 is reported, 
you would subtract 1 from this number get .14. This indicates that the covariate increases 
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the chance of adoption by approximately 14%. It is important to remember that since the 
enactment of a program is the hazard in the analysis, a covariate having a positive 
relationship to the dependent variable indicates that the covariate increases the likelihood 
of the enactment of market-based state health expansion program. A negative value 
indicates a lower probability of adoption.  
     Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) note that the use of models like the Cox 
proportional hazard model, which utilizes time-invariant covariates (or covariates whose 
influence remains proportional across time), can yield valuable information about the 
social world. They note that in interpreting results, one must be mindful that the estimates 
for covariates “reflect an underlying longitudinal process” and “reflect how risk increases 
or decreases across time” for some units relative to others (p. 1439).  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
    The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure showing whether there has been the 
adoption of a market-based health expansion program (a coding of “1” will be used to 
indicate when an adoption has occurred in that year, a coding of “0” will be used to 
indicate when an adoption has not occurred in that year). The data on whether these 
programs have been adopted at the state level and what year they were adopted was 
reported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’ website State Coverage Initiatives. It 
is important to note that this Cox regression analysis is a multiple failure model. This is 
necessary as it is theoretically possible that a state could adopt as many as five different 
programs during the period of interest. The analyses of the cases are clustered by 
adoption, as the adoption process is unique for each state.  Thus, for each state, the 
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duration variable begins at 0 and counts up 1 for each year that that the state does not 
adopt a market-based health expansion variable. When the state does adopt one of the 
five market-based health expansion variables, the duration variable was reset at 0. This 
process was repeated until the end of the period of study or until the last adoption of a 
market-based health expansion program within a state. It should be noted that in the Cox 
regression analysis, states were censored from the analysis after the last adoption in the 
state. Including cases within a state that did not lead to a failure by the end of the period 
of study made no difference to the results of the analysis. To test this, the analysis was 
run using these additional cases and the results proved to be the same.    
     As discussed by Hansford and Spriggs (2006), the Cox proportional regression 
analysis has observed and unobserved dependent variables.  
The observed dependent variable measures whether an event occurred at a particular 
point in time, or put differently, the length of time before an event occurs. The 
unobserved dependent variable is the hazard rate, or instantaneous risk that the event 
will occur at time t, conditional on the event not having occurred previously. A 
hazard rate is essentially analogous to a probability, except that the hazard rate does 
not have an upward bound of one (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006). 
 
     Thus, in this analysis, as the hazard rate increases the probability of a market-based 
health expansion program being adopted increases, and when the hazard rate decreases 
the probability of adoption decreases. Interpreting the coefficients, a positive coefficient 
indicates a covariate increases the probability of an adoption occurring and a negative 
coefficient indicates a decreased probability of an adoption occurring.  
 
Political Variables 
     Existing literature suggests that programs to expand health care garner more support 
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from politically liberal populations, but this support is tempered by public skepticism 
(Weissert and Weissert, 2006, p. 325). However, researchers like Barrilleaux and Brace 
(2007) note that market-based approaches to expanding health care tend to be favored 
more by conservative political forces. This is due to the fact that market-based 
approaches still seek to utilize the private insurance market by expanding access, while 
liberals tend to be distrustful of the private market. At the same time, conservatives are 
opposed to too much government intervention in the marketplace. To test this hypothesis, 
this study utilizes the measure of citizen ideology developed by Berry, et al. (1998). This 
measure is computed by taking interest group ratings for incumbents in a state legislative 
district, interest group ratings for challengers in a state legislative district, and comparing 
the election returns for each candidate to create a measure of the ideology of people in the 
district. The district level measures are then averaged to create a state-level measure. The 
ideology index goes from 0 (very conservative) to 100 (very liberal).  
H1: A higher level of citizen liberalism will have a negative relationship to the adoption 
of market-based state health expansion programs. 
 
     Another variable measures to what degree the legislature of a state is under 
Democratic control. This variable is the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature. 
Again, Democrats are not expected to be supporters of market-based programs, as the 
Democratic Party has historically championed government-based programs such 
Medicaid, Medicare, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (Weissert and 
Weissert, 2006). Also, in the past two decades it has been Democratic presidents, Bill 
Clinton and now Barack Obama, who have put forth proposals for universal health care.   
H2: There will be a negative relationship between Democratic control of the legislature 
and the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs. 
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     Previously cited literature (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001) noted that a state of divided 
government can increase the likelihood of adopting health policy. This is due to the fact 
that if party control of government is more closely divided between the Democratic and 
Republican parties, politicians from both sides will be more active in trying to court 
voters, in part through the creation of new programs (Key, 1949). One method of 
measuring whether or not a government is divided is the margin between the majority and 
minority parties in the legislature. This variable is measured as the difference between the 
percentage of seats held by the majority party and the percentage of seats held by the 
minority party. The hypothesis in regard to this variable is that a state of divided 
government will increase the likelihood for adoption of market-based state health 
programs. The data for whether or not a state has divided political control in a given year 
is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract.     
H3: The presence of divided government in the state will have a positive relationship to 
the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.   
 
      The fourth political variable included in the analysis takes into account whether or not 
the state under consideration is a Southern state. Researchers in the area of political 
culture (Elazar, 1966; Johnson, 1976; Morgan and Watson, 1991) all found that the vast 
majority of southern states have traditionalistic political cultures which view government 
as a “means of maintaining the existing order” (Elazar, 1966 as quoted in Koven and 
Mausolff, 2002, p. 69). These traditionalistic states would be most likely to oppose major 
government intervention in the private health care market, and thus more likely to support 
market-based programs which require less direct government intervention. Also, southern 
states have historically been opposed to change enforced by the federal government. 
Therefore, one would expect that Southern states would be more likely to adopt market-
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based programs to expand health care as an alternative to more top-down, government-
based programs.  
H4: Southern states will be more likely to adopt market-based state health expansion 
programs than non-Southern states.  
 
     Three additional political covariates included in the analysis examine the role of the 
presence of health care-related lobbyists in a state, as previous literature as indicated that 
they can have a significant influence on public policy (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and 
McAtee, 2004). The covariates are coded as the percentage of lobbyists in a state which 
represent a particular interest related to health care. The three lobbying interests 
examined are lobbyists for groups seeking to expand health care, lobbyists representing 
the interests of employers in the state, and lobbyists representing the interests of the 
insurance companies. While these categories of lobbyists represent divergent interests, 
they are all hypothesized to contribute to the adoption of market-based health insurance 
expansion programs. Advocates for health care expansion reform would be expected to 
support a variety of strategies for expanding coverage, including government-based and 
market-based efforts. Lobbyists representing the interests of employers would be 
hypothesized to support the adoption of the market-based health insurance reforms 
because the majority are designed to either directly or indirectly benefit small employers. 
In regard to the insurance industry, most of these reforms seek to expand access to the 
private insurance industry in some way, which would have the effect of enlarging their 
customer base. Even those programs which establish an alternative mechanism, such as 
high-risk pools, are not intended as competition to the insurance industry but as a way to 
expand access to insurance with placing expensive mandates on health insurance 
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companies. Therefore lobbyists representing the insurance industry would be expected to 
support the adoption of market-based programs.  
H5: A higher percentage of lobbyists in a state representing the interests of health care 
expansion advocates will have a positive relationship with the adoption of market-based 
health expansion programs.   
 
H6: A higher percentage of lobbyists in a state representing the interests of employers 
will have a positive relationship with the adoption of market-based health expansion 
programs.  
 
H7: A higher percentage of lobbyists in a state representing the interests of the insurance 
industry will have a positive relationship with the adoption of market-based health 
expansion programs.  
 
Need Variables 
     This study also seeks to account for variables which could affect the need for market-
based incremental health programs. One important social variable which can create a 
greater need for health care expansion, according to the literature, is the racial 
composition of a state. The literature notes that minorities are more likely to both suffer 
from serious health conditions and to lack adequate access to health care (Brown, et al, 
2000; Longest, 2006). Therefore, one could hypothesize that states with larger minority 
populations would have more need for programs to expand access to health care, and thus 
would be more likely to adopt such programs. This study tests this hypothesis by utilizing 
a measure of the percentage of minorities (non-white citizens in a state) as reported in the 
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract. It is hypothesized that states with larger 
populations of minorities will be more likely to adopt market-based state health 
programs.     
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H8: A larger minority population will have a positive relationship with the adoption of 
market-based state health expansion programs.  
 
     Another variable related to need is the percentage of small employers in a state that 
provide health insurance benefits to their employees, as reported by the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey. Analysts like Morrissey (2008) have noted the difficulties that 
small employers can face when trying to cover their employees, particularly in regard to 
affordability. This variable is particularly relevant to the issue of the adoption of market-
based state health expansion programs, as many of these programs are created with the 
goal of allowing small businesses or other types of small organizations to provide health 
insurance coverage to underserved populations. Uninsured small business employees 
could be viewed as a key client population in terms of market-based programs. Thus a 
state with a lower percentage of small businesses which provide such coverage would 
seem to have greater need of market-based state health expansion programs. This study 
hypothesizes that states with a higher percentage of small employers that provide health 
insurance coverage to employees will be less likely to adopt market-based state health 
programs due to a lower level of need.  
H9: A higher level of small employer-provided health care will have a negative 
relationship with the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.  
 
     A third variable related to need is the gross level of uninsured people in the state. The 
literature has laid out a good case for the myriad of social ills created by lack of insurance 
coverage (Davis, et al, 2007; National Academies, 2003; Hadley, 2003; Wolman and 
Miller, 2004). While the variable for the percentage of small employers in a state which 
provides coverage to their employees is expected to be a better explanatory covariate for 
the purposes of this analysis, this study does seek to test the relationship between the 
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overall level of uninsured and the adoption of market-based programs. As these programs 
are touted as an alternative to the more traditional government-based programs, one could 
argue that a higher level of uninsured in a state will encourage adoption of these 
programs.  
H10: A higher overall level of uninsured in a state will have a positive relationship with 
the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.  
 
     A fourth variable examining the need for market-based state health programs is the 
percentage of a state’s population that is members of unions. Historically, being a 
member of a union has been an important source of health coverage for many Americans 
Feldstein, 2007; Morrissey, 2008, p. 11). Thus, the hypothesis in regard to this variable is 
that the higher the percentage of unionization in a state, the less likely the state would  
have a need for market-based health insurance programs. The data regarding the 
percentage of a state’s population that is union members was taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical Abstract.  
H11: A higher level of union membership in a state will have a negative relationship with 
the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.  
 
 
    Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates in the Adoption Study 
 
 
Median Mode Min. Max. Skewness 
Majority 
Control 
23.6 n/a 2.7 86.8 1.02 
Citizen 
Ideology 
44.4 n/a 9.3 72.9 .011 
Democratic 
Control 
53 n/a 11 91 .227 
Southern 
States 
n/a 0 0 1 1.05 
Minority 
Population 
17.9 n/a 1.6 56 .763 
Small Business 40.8 n/a 29.4 58.7 .384 
Unionization 12.6 n/a 2.9 47.2 1.55 
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Table 5-2: Hypothesized Relationships between Covariates and Adoption of Market-Based 
Programs1 
Covariates Hypothesized Relationship to Adoption of Market-
Based Health Programs 
Citizen Liberalism - 
Democratic Control - 
Divided Government - 
Southern State - 
Health Expansion Advocates + 
Employer Advocates + 
Insurance Advocates + 
Minority Population + 
Small Business + 
Union Membership - 
Percentage Uninsured + 
 
   
     Reviewing the descriptive statistics for the adoption study, the first group of  
 
covariates measure political factors affecting the adoption of market-based programs. 
One variable in this vein, the level of citizen liberalism in a state, was 44.4 (on a range of 
0-100). This indicates, similarly to the institutional ideology variable used in the 
effectiveness study, that state citizens trended slightly conservative. The minimum level 
of citizen ideology in the data set was 9.3 and a maximum value was 72.9. A second 
political variable, the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature, had a median of 
53%, with a minimum of 11% and a maximum of 91%. The variable measuring the 
percentage difference between the majority and minority party in the legislature had a 
median of 23.6%, with a minimum of 2.7% and a maximum of 86.8%. The final political 
variable in the adoption is the dummy variable representing whether a state is Southern or 
non-Southern, which had a mode of 0. Interestingly, all of these variables were positively 
skewed to various degrees.  
     The remaining variables in this analysis focus on socioeconomic factors affecting the 
adoption of market-based programs. The first variable in this group, the percentage of 
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minority population in a state, had a median of 17.9%, with a minimum of 1.6% and a 
maximum of 56%. The second socioeconomic variable, the percentage of small 
employers providing coverage to their employees, had a median of 40.8%, indicating that 
in general a little less than half of the small employers in a state provide coverage to their 
employees. The minimum for this variable was 29.4% and the maximum was 58.7%. The 
final variable in this group, the percentage of unionization in state, had a median of 
12.6%, with a minimum of 2.9% and a maximum of 47.2%. All of these variables were 
positively skewed to various degrees.                  
 
Selection of Statistical Software 
     The analyses for both portions of this dissertation were completed with Intercooled 
STATA version 9. This software offered clear benefits to other available software 
packages, particularly SPSS. In regard to the Cox proportional hazard model, the STATA 
software allows for the use of robust standard errors. The use of these robust standard 
errors allows for a more accurate estimation of the true relationship between the 
covariates included in the model and the adoption or non-adoption of market-based health 
insurance expansion programs. While the option of using the Cox proportional hazard 
model is available in SPSS as well, the use of default standard errors is more likely to 
produce biased statistical results. 
 
Test for Proportionality/Correlation 
 
The key concern in regard to whether a covariate is appropriate to use in a Cox 
proportional hazard regression model is whether or not the effect of the covariate on the 
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dependent variable is proportional across time. A key assumption of the Cox model is 
that the effect of the covariates does not increase or decrease as the duration increases 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). As duration is already accounted for in the model, 
if a covariate’s effect varies across time the results of the model will be biased. Therefore 
it is important to conduct a diagnostic to investigate whether there is any evidence that 
the effects of the covariates are not proportional. One common diagnostic is to use 
Schoenfeld residuals, which can be generated by statistical software packages like 
STATA (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).  
A statistical test can then be run using these residuals to test the proportional hazard 
assumption. Once you have the Schoenfeld residuals, one can censor those cases where a 
“failure” (in this case the adoption of a market-based program) did not occur. One can 
then create a variable containing the ranked order of survival time (in this case the ranked 
order of the “Duration” variable). A test of correlation can then be run between the 
ranked order of survival time and the residuals. If any statistically significant correlations 
are found that indicates that the proportional hazard assumption is violated (Kim, n.d.). 
No statistically significant correlations were found when this analysis was run, indicating 
that none of these covariates violate the proportional hazard assumption. The results of 
this analysis can be found in Exhibit K of the Appendix.  
Correlation tests were also run on the independent variables to determine whether or 
not any of them were highly correlated with each other, thereby biasing the analysis. 
None of the variables were found to be correlated above the .8 threshold, indicating that 
we can be confident that the analysis is not being biased. The results of these bivariate 
correlations can be found in Exhibit L of the Appendix. Bivariate regression analyses 
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were also run on the covariates in the analysis to further test for endogeneity. These 
analyses found that the relationships had adjusted R-squares well below .5, indicating that 
endogeneity is not an issue likely to affect the Cox regression analysis. The results of the 
bivariate regression analyses can be found in Exhibit M of the Appendix.    
 
Analysis 
 
The table below shows the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard analysis examining the 
effect of the covariates of interest on the adoption of market-based health expansion 
programs. These results provide support for a number of political and social covariates 
being important to the analysis, but also indicate a number are not significant. 
 
 
Table 5-3: Cox Results for the Model of the Adoption of Market-based Programs (First Version)2 
Covariates Hazard Rate Robust Standard 
Error 
Z P>Z 
Divided 
Government 
1.01 .008 1.34 0.18 
Democratic 
Control 
2.29 .534 3.54 0.000 
Citizen Ideology 1.00 .011 0.06 0.95 
Southern States .401 .126 -2.91 0.004 
Health Expansion 
Advocates 
1.17 6.94 0.03 0.98 
Employer 
Advocates 
9.13e+23 2.89e+25 1.74 0.081 
Insurance 
Advocates 
5.57e-06 .00008 -0.84 0.400 
Small Business .965 .029 -1.20 0.232 
Minority 1.03 .015 2.24 0.025 
Union 
Membership 
1.00 .028 0.15 0.883 
Uninsured 1.01 .060 0.23 0.818 
No. of subjects=309 
No. of failures=51 
Time at risk=1458 
Wald Chi-square=39.04 
P>0.0001 
Log pseudolikelihood=-207.85 
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     The results of the Cox regression analysis are decidedly mixed. There are a number of 
significant covariates, but also a number of covariates demonstrating a low level of 
statistical significance and/or substantive significance. It is possible that these variables 
demonstrating very low levels of significance are obscuring the significance of other 
variables. Therefore, a second, more parsimonious model was run, omitting some of the 
lower performing variables. The interest group variables were omitted by from the 
second model because all three demonstrated either low statistical significance, low 
substantive significance in terms of the hazard ratio, or both. The gross measure of the 
percentage uninsured in the state was also omitted from the second analysis as it did not 
prove to be statistically significant and it is possible that that the variable is obscuring the 
significance of the other covariates, particularly the percentage of small employers in a 
state providing health coverage.   
 
Table 5-4: Cox Regression Results for the Adoption of Market-based Health Insurance Programs 
Covariates Hazard Rate Robust Standard 
Error 
Z P>Z 
Divided 
Government 
.999 .007 -0.09 0.93 
Democratic 
Control 
1.07 .013 5.41 0.000 
Citizen Ideology .973 .013 -2.00 0.05 
Southern States .156 .078 -3.71 0.000 
Small Business .956 .018 -2.44 0.02 
Minority 1.03 .011 3.06 0.002 
Union 
Membership 
1.00 .027 -0.01 0.993 
No. of subjects=309 
No. of failures=51 
Time at Risk=1458 
Wald Chi-Square=43.02 
P>.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood=-205.17 
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Political Variables 
     The results of the analysis indicate that a greater level of Democratic control of the 
legislature increases the probability of market-based health programs being adopted. This 
runs counter to the hypothesis that Democrats oppose efforts that depend on the private 
health insurance market or market principles. However, there is anecdotal evidence that 
Democrats, under certain conditions, do support more market-oriented approaches to 
expanding health care, such as tax incentives. This was particularly true in the wake of 
the failure of the Clinton health care program. In the absence of a political environment 
where there is a strong push for more government-based health care, it has been argued 
the Democrats will support whatever policies can gain enough support to pass, which 
may include the market-based programs. It is important to note that there is evidence that, 
in the aftermath of the Clinton plan, Democrats have become more receptive to tax-based 
coverage subsidies, with such ideologically opposed figures as Democrat Lloyd Bentsen 
and Republican Dick Armey coming out in favor of tax credits to expand coverage in the 
early 21st century. Democratic movement on the issue could be seen somewhat during the 
2000 presidential election, with Vice President Al Gore incorporating a small tax credit 
proposal in his health care platform (Toner and Stolberg 2002).  
     In 2001, with the passage of the Bush tax cut and a possible recession approaching, 
Democrats were forced to accept that tax credits were their best option for expanding 
access to health care. That year, then-Republican senator James Jeffords proposed the 
REACH Act, which offered $1000 tax credits for individuals and $2500 tax credits 
families to aid them in paying for health insurance coverage. While the REACH Act 
failed to get anywhere in Congress, it marked a political breakthrough because Jeffords 
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was joined by a number of Democrats in championing the bill. In 2002, Democrats like 
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle were critical of the use of tax credits, but their 
actual legislative behavior said otherwise (Toner and Stolberg 2002).  
     In Fiscal Year 2003 the president proposed a budget with a tax credit for the uninsured 
worth $89 billion over ten years. Democrats opposed the measure because the credit was 
primarily targeted at the individual market and the party was concerned that it would 
cause people to leave employer-provided plans. Meanwhile, the Democrats were 
successful in inserting a refundable tax credit for workers displaced by trade deals into 
the Trade Adjustment Act. A bipartisan proposal was made to use the tax credit for 
individual and employer-provided coverage. The president’s budget proposal failed, but a 
tax credit was included in the Trade Adjustment Act (Cunningham, 2002).  
     While there is evidence that Democratic control of the state legislature contributes to 
adoption of market-based programs, the covariate for citizen ideology supported the 
hypothesis that a higher level of citizen liberalism will stand in opposition to the adoption 
of the market-based programs. This supports the contention that states with a more 
strongly liberal citizenry are less accepting of these market-based programs, seeing them 
as less effective competitors to government-based programs. This finding does highlight 
the ideological divide in the Democratic Party. While the Democratic Party is 
conventionally associated with liberal policies, the debate over the Obama 
administration’s health care plan has highlighted the fact that there is a significant portion 
of the Democratic party which has conservative tendencies, particularly in regard to 
issues like health care which many people can find threatening. The conflicting findings 
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between Democratic control of government and citizen ideology highlight statistically the 
policy differences between Democratic politicians and die-hard liberal populations.  
     Looking at the covariate for the presence of divided government, the finding for this 
covariate indicates that the presence of divided government in a state has no statistically 
significant effect on the probability of market-based programs being enacted. It was 
expected that this kind of program would be more likely to pass under conditions of 
divided government, as these programs do combine elements of liberal and  
conservative policy. However, the findings indicate that lack of partisan unity in 
government did not have a significant effect on the passage of these programs.  
     The covariate for whether or not a state is a Southern state did not perform as 
hypothesized in the analysis. Southern states were expected to be more amenable to the 
adoption of market-based health care programs, as they represent an alternative to more 
coercive government-based efforts. However, the results indicate that Southern states are 
less likely to adopt market-based programs. While this finding deserves closer study, this 
finding may stem from the fact that Southern states may view even the market-based 
programs as an unacceptable intrusion into the private market. Recall that that while these 
programs emphasize the role of the private market and behave according to market 
principles, the programs do require some degree of government action. The politicians 
and population of Southern states may look negatively upon even limited government 
intrusion.    
 
Need Variables 
 
     Looking at the covariates related to need, the analysis indicates that the higher the 
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percentage of small businesses in a state which provide health insurance benefits to their 
employees, the less likely these programs are to be enacted. This supports the hypothesis 
that a higher percentage of small employers providing health care benefits to their 
employees reduces the need for market-based programs.  
     The covariate for the percentage of minorities in the state also fits into the hypothesis. 
The literature notes the fact that minority populations in the states and the nation as a 
whole are both at greater risk for serious medical conditions and often have more 
difficulty accessing medical care (Brown, et al, 2000; Longest, 2006). Therefore it was 
hypothesized that a higher minority population in a state would have a positive effect on 
the adoption of market-based state health expansion efforts. This hypothesis was 
supported by the analysis, which did find a positive relationship between the percentage 
of minorities in a state and the adoption of market-based programs. This seems to support 
the broader idea that the greater the level of need a state faces in regard to access to 
health care, the more likely a state will adopt a program to address it. This finding should 
be further researched, however, as the literature does suggest that the factors which lead 
to a higher uninsured rate among minority populations (notably ability to pay) would 
limit the ability of the market-based programs to help.  
     The final covariate in this model is the percentage of a state’s population which are 
union members. This covariate was not found to be statistically significant in the 
analysis, suggesting that unions may no longer be the force in the provision of health care 
that they once were.  This has been suggested by the discussion of the Obama health care 
reform being partially funded by taxation of union health care plans, dubbed by some as 
“cadillac plans.”  
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Discussion of Cox Regression Results  
     The results of the Cox regression analysis indicate that the adoption of market-based 
health expansion programs is politically driven, as well as being influenced by the need 
for health expansion programs. The results note an interesting conflict between the 
covariate for Democratic control of the state legislature and the level of citizen ideology 
in the state. The level of Democratic control of the legislature was found to be significant 
and positive in the analysis, while the level of citizen liberalism was found to be 
significant and negative. This is a notable finding as conventional wisdom associates the 
Democratic party with more liberal policies. Thus it was hypothesized that both of these 
variables would have a negative relationship with the adoption of market-based 
programs. The fact that the results for both of these covariates were statistically 
significant but in the opposite directions indicate that the Democratic Party is not 
beholden to liberal ideology. This highlights the fact that there is a significant 
conservative wing of the Democratic Party, as was illustrated by the debate over the 
health care reform plan proposed by the Obama administration. Conservative Democrats, 
particularly those from the southern part of the United States known as “blue dogs,” were 
a significant part of the opposition to Obama’s proposal. As President Obama’s proposal 
called for, in part, an expansion of publicly provided health care, it had strong support 
among the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. This is indicative of how complex and 
divisive the health insurance issue can be, as even Democrats, who widely agree that 
health insurance should be accessible to all, had difficulty uniting behind a reform plan 
proposed by a president of their own party at the time of this writing. However, 
Democrats, like their Republican counterparts, also face opposition to universal health 
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care from constituents concerned about the effect a major change in the American health 
care system will have on their own coverage. Therefore, Democrats as a party are 
constrained by their conservative elements, while support for more broad-based health 
care reform is strong in highly liberal areas. 
     However, this explanation of the findings for Democratic control of the legislature and 
citizen ideology complicates to some degree the explanation of the covariate for Southern 
states. The analysis indicates a statistically significant and negative relationship between 
states in the Southern part of the U.S. and the adoption of market-based programs. It was 
hypothesized that Southern states, with a more conservative political ideology and an 
opposition to government intervention in the marketplace, would be supportive of 
market-based health expansion programs. However, while these programs are not purely 
market-based and do involve some government action, it is possible that even this more 
moderate intervention in the private marketplace is not palatable to populations in the 
South. Thus, Democratic support for market-based health expansion programs could be 
seen as splitting the difference between the conservative South and more liberal regions.    
      The significant results of the analysis for the covariates measuring the need for health 
expansion programs were as hypothesized. The percentage of small employers providing 
coverage to their employees was found to be significant and negative. This supports the 
hypothesis that, as market-based programs are designed in a manner to directly or 
indirectly benefit small businesses, the higher the percentage of small employers that 
already provide coverage to their employees, the less need there is for market-based 
programs. Conversely, the higher the percentage of minorities living in a state, the more 
likely a state will adopt a market-based program. This supports the hypothesis that, as 
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minorities are in greater need of access to health care, states with higher minority 
populations will more actively pursue programs with the goal of expanding access to 
health care. While these programs are narrower in their impacts as opposed to 
government-based programs, states with populations of great need would be expected to 
pursue a variety of options. The covariate for the percentage of unionized people in a 
state was not found to be statistically significant, suggesting that need as it relates to 
market-based programs should be measured in more targeted ways.   
      The findings of this analysis indicate that Democrats are supportive of market-based 
programs, which can be viewed as conservative in nature and do not enjoy a great deal of 
support among liberal constituencies. While this support among Democrats may be due 
to the fact that these programs are seen as effective, it may also be due to the fact that 
Democrats recognize the need to expand access to health care and often face difficulty in 
getting broader, more government-based programs adopted. Thus Democrats may 
gravitate toward more pragmatic solutions which can be passed and allow them to claim a 
political victory. However, the relationship between party affiliation and ideological 
policy preferences is deserving of further study, particularly in terms of the moderating 
effects of the need for a policy.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF THE ADOPTION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKET-BASED 
PROGRAMS  
     The overall purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the effectiveness of market-
based approaches in expanding access to health care, as well as what factors contribute 
(or stand in opposition to) the adoption of these programs at the state level. In this 
chapter, the results of the market-based effectiveness and adoption analyses are discussed 
in regard to how they relate to each other, and what these results say about the nature of 
these programs and suggest about the future of American health policy. 
     It would seem that the five market-based health expansion programs at issue in this 
dissertation, taken as a whole, were successful in helping to bring about positive 
developmental effects for the U.S. states, despite their often narrow focus. The programs 
contributed to reducing mortality per capita, boosting gross state product, and bringing 
down the level of emergency outpatients treated per capita. The adoption study sought to 
determine whether or not partisan affiliation and ideology could explain the limited 
adoption of these market-based health expansion efforts across the U.S.  The results of 
this study indicates that a higher percentage of Democrats in the state legislature was 
positively related with the adoption of market-based programs, but the level of citizen 
ideology in the state was negatively related to the adoption of these programs. In terms of 
the control covariates, Southern states and the percentage of small businesses providing 
health care to their employees were negatively related with the adoption of market-based 
programs, and the presence of a higher percentage of minorities in a state is positively 
related with the adoption of these programs. Taken together, these findings suggest 
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Democrats pursue more centrist approaches to expanding access to health care due to a 
higher level of need in the state, and these programs actually do provide general 
socioeconomic benefits for the people of a state.   
     If these market-based expansion programs are in fact effective in delivering general 
societal benefits for the people of a state, that then raises the policy issue of whether 
government should pursue health care expansion through these market-based programs or 
through government-based programs. While this study does not seek to systematically 
compare the effectiveness of market-based as opposed to government-based health care 
programs, there is anecdotal evidence at the state level which suggests that efforts to take 
a more government-based approach to expand health care have ultimately resulted in the 
government retreating to more incremental, market-based programs. One recent example 
comes from the state of Tennessee, which implemented a government-based, universal 
health care program in the wake of the Clinton health care plan which proved financially 
and politically unsustainable and was eventually replaced by a market-based program, 
which promoted the expansion of employer-offered coverage and established a state 
high-risk health insurance pool. In the following section, the example of TennCare and 
Cover Tennessee is explored and suggests that, at the state level, market-based efforts 
will ultimately prove more effective because they can enjoy more longevity.   
 
Government versus Market-based Health Care Expansion: TennCare and Cover 
Tennessee 
     The findings regarding the analysis of the effectiveness and adoption of market-based 
programs are supported anecdotally by Tennessee’s experience with TennCare and the 
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Cover Tennessee programs. This example illustrates how a Democratic gubernatorial 
administration sought to expand access to health care through a government-based 
program in the wake of the Clinton program’s failure, and how that program was 
eventually replaced with a narrower, more market-based collection of programs by 
another Democratic governor. The example of TennCare and Cover Tennessee also 
illustrates that in the face of political pressure, Democratic politicians will pursue more 
moderate policy options as opposed to continuing liberal programs initiated by their 
predecessor.  
     Since the advent of the Obama administration, there has been a perception that the 
U.S. is again moving toward developing a national health care program for the first time 
since the Clinton plan in 1993. In the last few years, a number of states have implemented 
or considered implementing some form of universal health care. This might lead one to 
wonder if the market-based programs examined in this analysis are really policy solutions 
in their own right, or stopgaps until such universal coverage can be achieved. At the state 
level, the Tennessee example indicates that states may lack the political and economic 
stability to sustain government-based universal health care in the long term, making 
market-based initiatives a good alternative solution. It is also illustrative of the idea that 
Democratic politicians may pursue liberal policies at a time where the base is greatly 
energized, but will pursue more pragmatic solutions when such programs become 
politically and fiscally unsustainable.  These are issues deserving of more in-depth study.  
 
Discussion 
 
     The example of the TennCare/Cover Tennessee program is instructive as it illustrates 
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how a Democratic state set out on a path to enact a more progressive, government-based 
initiative, and pursued a market-based alternative when that program proved 
unsustainable. It also illustrates how the Cover Tennessee program was quickly attacked 
for not succeeding according to rather narrow criteria for effectiveness, such as not 
meeting enrollment targets or having limited payouts. However, as was noted in the 
discussion of previous evaluations of market-based initiatives, if previous researchers 
were correct in their proposition that market-based programs can have developmental 
benefits, for a state to really gauge whether these market-based programs are effective 
one must evaluate them more broadly.      
     The Tennessee experience also suggests that a lack of political stability or support at 
the state level will make any effort at long-term universal health care policy difficult to 
sustain. While it may be feasible to enact universal health care at the national level 
because of the broader base of political support and greater stability, the example of 
TennCare suggests that a universal, government-based model at the state level will be 
very difficult to preserve. However, as noted in the previous literature, the problem of 
uninsurance takes a serious toll at the state level, and state legislators can ill afford not to 
take action. Therefore, an alternative to a universal model may be more incremental, 
market-based reforms. While these programs may not have the numbers in terms of 
enrollment or benefits that programs such as TennCare might have, the preceding 
statistical evidence suggests that taken as a whole they may be able to deliver indirect 
developmental benefits to the people of a state that may go unaccounted for.     
     The policy debate regarding government-based versus market-based health care is 
unlikely to be resolved in the near future. What the preceding research suggests is that the 
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market-based health expansion programs do present a meaningful alternative to 
government-based programs in terms of providing general societal benefits to the people 
of the implementing states. 
     The example of TennCare and Cover Tennessee as well as the results of the previous 
analysis of the adoption of these market-based programs, highlights the fact that the 
market-based health expansion programs fit into a new policy paradigm wherein 
government seeks to address social problems by utilizing the private sector and non-profit 
organizations, one example of which is governing by network. Such programs may allow 
Democrats who may not be able to sell their constituents on liberal, government-based 
programs to still take action on the health care issue. There is a substantial body of 
literature on the role of ideology in state policy which indicates that ideology has long 
had an inconsistent influence of the enactment of policy (Entman, 1983; Barrilleaux and 
Miller, 1988; Berry and Berry, 1992; Meier and McFarlane, 1993; Grogan, 1994; Brown, 
1995; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Plotnick and Winters, 1985; Jacoby and Schneider, 
2003; Appelbaum, 2001; Kousser, 2002; Sapat, 2004; Rudolph and Evans, 2005; Hays, 
1996). A higher presence of conservatism or liberalism in a state legislature or general 
population did not always lead to the policy enactments or outcomes hypothesized, as 
politicians can be constrained by the values of their constituency. This was borne out by 
the analyses in Chapters Two and Four.   
     The need for more pragmatic solutions to social problems could explain the 
gravitation toward more market-oriented policy models, such as governing by network, a 
concept which was co-developed by Stephen Goldsmith, a former Republican mayor of 
Indianapolis (Eggers, 1993). High-risk pools, a market-based program which has been 
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prominent in this dissertation and which was implemented as part of the Cover Tennessee 
program, fits well into this paradigm. 
     These programs have aspects which are appealing to both conservatives and liberals. 
Its conservative appeal stems from the fact that the pools largely do not require an 
extensive state bureaucracy, a significant utilization of state funds, or an undue 
government intervention into the private market. Rather than taking high-risk individuals 
entirely out of the private insurance market, these programs are creating a system wherein 
these individuals can receive the coverage they need without the insurance companies 
being forced to accept undue financial risk. From a liberal perspective, high-risk pools 
still represent a government effort to help those who are in dire need of coverage but have 
been denied it. This cross-ideological appeal may account for why high-risk pools have 
diffused among traditionalist states like Texas (government represents “a means of 
maintaining the existing order”),  moralist states like California (“government is 
considered a legitimate instrument for promoting social welfare”), and individualistic 
states like Illinois (“government was instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons to handle 
functions demanded by the people it served”) (Elazar, 1966 as quoted in Koven and 
Mausolff, 2002, p. 69). This diverse appeal is suggested by the findings of the adoption 
analysis in Chapter Four, which indicate that market-based health expansion programs 
are more likely to be found in states with a higher percentage of Democrats in the 
legislature, as well as in states with a higher minority population.  
     This dissertation finds evidence through the study of market-based program 
effectiveness that these programs can actually produce some of the general 
developmental effects suggested by previous researchers (Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007), 
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including reducing mortality per capita, increasing gross state product, and reducing 
reliance on emergency room care. If the results of the effectiveness analysis hold true, it 
would explain why these programs would be adopted in the presence of a more strongly 
Democratic state legislature, despite a lack of support among liberal citizens. The 
findings of the adoption study in Chapter Four suggest that the market-based health 
expansion programs do not fit into the traditional liberal-driven policy paradigm. Perhaps 
more importantly, this dissertation indicates that these programs can have significant 
cumulative benefits for the state, despite the fact that individually these programs are 
small in scale. More research should be done to examine the nexus between the 
effectiveness of these market-based programs and their adoption, to determine to what 
degree the effectiveness of these programs is driving their support among conservative 
and liberal politicians alike.                    
 
Next Steps 
 
     Additional research should attempt to compare the effectiveness of market-based 
programs and government-based programs. As noted in Chapter Two, evaluations of 
health care expansion programs, both market-based and government-based, have been 
narrowly focused on outputs such as client enrollment, with little attention given to the 
general socioeconomic impacts. More research should be done in terms of the general 
effects of both the government-based and market-based programs so that a meaningful 
comparison can be made.    
     Future analyses of the effectiveness of market-based reforms should include additional 
variables to take into account the unique characteristics of a state’s health insurance 
market. These characteristics, particular to each state, may influence the degree to which 
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the market-based programs affect the dependent variables. Future research should also 
better parse out the unique characteristics of a state’s population and of the market-based 
programs themselves. Each state has unique social and economic characteristics which 
could affect the levels of the dependent variables and the degree to which the market-
based health expansion programs can provide aid to that population.     
     Also, each type of market-based program is unique, with important differences among 
programs. This was addressed to a certain extent in the effectiveness analysis of the high-
risk pools, which took into account the different levels of accessibility in terms of cost. 
Future research should build on this by taking into account differences among limited 
benefit plans, reinsurance programs, group purchasing arrangements, the HIFA waivers, 
and the high-risk pools. Research growing out of this dissertation should also go more in 
depth into identifying and analyzing the channels through which market-based programs 
can exert their effects on a state population. The effectiveness study tried to identify 
independent control variables which would capture this, but more specific controls could 
be utilized in future research.  
     Continuing this research could expand our understanding of the true benefits we attain 
from pursuing policies in areas like the expansion of health insurance coverage, whether 
through a government program or a market-based initiative. Often the benefits of these 
programs are discussed in terms of enrollment or cost savings to the state. Many argue 
that society in general wins if more people have access to services like health care, but it 
has not been a well-studied topic in the social sciences. Establishing in a comprehensive 
and quantitative manner that helping the uninsured to receive coverage truly does benefit 
everyone could reduce societal resistance to such efforts. Also, demonstrating that these 
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general benefits for society can be created through programs that utilize the market as 
well as government programs could help to weaken the sort of ideological entrenchment 
that was seen in the 2009 health care debate. This research is applicable to other areas of 
social policy as well, and research of this kind should be used to exam the effects of 
programs administered by non-profit and for-profit organizations in areas like education, 
job placement, and the environment.  
     What the preceding research can contribute to the conversation regarding health care 
in America is that there is some evidence that these market-based programs, while limited 
in scale and incremental, can have meaningful effects. One inference you can draw from 
this is that the uninsured is a population composed of many segments of the American 
public, each facing unique issues and challenges. Any plan to provide health care 
universally must recognize this fact, otherwise some segment of the uninsured could still 
slip through cracks in the system.     
     In conclusion, the experience of the American health care system since 1993 suggests 
that it is moving toward a hybrid of publicly and privately provided health care. Based on 
current data, lack of access to health care remains a serious and growing problem in the 
U.S., and is having wider societal and economic impacts for the country. By that same 
token, there is some evidence that even smaller-scale, market-based health expansion 
efforts, taken as a whole, positively affect some of these outcomes. The results of the 
preceding research also suggest that the adoption of these programs are supported by 
Democratic lawmakers, indicating that there is support for market-based health access 
expansion efforts from those who traditionally would champion more government-based 
solutions.  
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     As was exhibited in the health reform debate of 2009, there is a regrettable lack of 
common ground in terms of how to expand access to health care in a politically charged 
environment. However, the debate will never be able to move beyond partisan conflict 
until we truly understand what programs, government-based and market-based, truly aid 
the uninsured and what costs or benefits these programs hold for society as a whole. This 
dissertation will hopefully serve as a small first step in moving that research agenda 
forward. In the meantime, in the absence of the implementation of universal health care at 
the national level, policymakers, including Democrats, will continue to promote more 
incremental, market-based efforts, even though more liberal groups continue to champion 
government-based efforts. Further research should be done to build upon the evidence 
that these programs, in the aggregate, do provide positive developmental effects for a 
state, such improving health, as improving economic productivity, and relieving the 
pressure on hospital emergency rooms.  
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APPENDIX 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
 
Exhibit A 
 
Market-based Health Insurance Programs and the States Which Adopted                                
Them Prior to 2003 
 
 Reinsurance  
Programs 
Limited 
Benefit 
Plans 
Group 
Purchasing  
Arrangements 
Health 
Insurance 
Flexibility and  
Accountability  
Waivers 
High-Risk Pools 
Arizona 
Idaho  
Massachusetts 
New Mexico  
New York  
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Florida 
Minnesota 
Montana 
New Jersey  
North 
Dakota 
Utah  
Arkansas 
California 
Kansas 
New York  
Ohio  
Texas  
West Virginia  
Wisconsin  
Arizona 
California 
Colorado  
Illinois 
Maine 
New Jersey  
New Mexico  
Oregon  
Alabama       Nebraska             
Alaska           New Hampshire  
Arizona         New Mexico  
Arkansas       North Dakota  
California      Oklahoma 
Colorado       Oregon 
Connecticut   South Carolina 
Florida           South Dakota 
Idaho              Texas 
Illinois            Utah 
Indiana           Washington 
Iowa               Wisconsin 
Kansas            Wyoming 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
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Exhibit B            
 
Variables, Sources, Coding and Level of Measurement for the Independent and  
 
Dependent Variables in the Study of the Effectiveness of State Market-Based Health      
 
Insurance Programs 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Data Source Description Level of 
Measurement 
Market-based Health 
Index 
The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation State Coverage 
Initiatives web site 
Additive index of how many of 
the market-based health 
expansion programs have been 
implemented in the state. Ranges 
from 0 to 5.  
Ordinal  
Index of State High-
Risk Health Insurance 
Pools 
The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation State Coverage 
Initiatives web site 
Index measuring the presence and 
affordability of high-risk pools in 
a state. Ranges from 0 (absence 
of a pool) to 5 (pool operates and 
offers coverage at 150% of 
average market rate).  
Ordinal  
SCHIP/Medicaid 1115 
waivers  
The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation State Coverage 
Initiatives web site 
Ordinal variables indicating the 
presence or absence of the 
SCHIP program and Medicaid 
1115 waivers in a state 
(0=absence of programs, 
1=presence). 
Ordinal 
Institutional Ideology Web Site of Dr. Richard 
Fording, University of 
Kentucky 
Index of the level of liberalism of 
the legislature in a state 
(0=highly conservative, 
100=highly liberal).  
Interval 
Percentage of Uninsured 
in a State 
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage of a state’s total 
population which does not have 
health insurance in a given year 
Ratio 
Percentage of a State’s 
Population in Poverty  
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage of a state’s total 
population living below the 
federal poverty level in a given 
year 
Ratio 
Percentage of a State 
Population that is 
Unemployed 
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage of a state’s total 
population that is without 
employment in a given year   
Ratio 
Hospital Beds Per 
Capita 
American Hospital Association 
Statistical Abstracts 
Total number of hospital beds in 
a state divided by the total state 
population 
Ratio 
State Employees Per 
Capita 
The Book of the States Total number of people in a state 
employed by the state 
government divided by the 
population   
Ratio 
Percentage of a State’s 
Population Belonging to 
Unions 
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Total number of people in a state 
belonging to a labor union 
divided by the total state 
population 
Ratio 
Percentage of a State 
Composed of 
Metropolitan Areas 
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Total square miles of area in a 
state constituting a metropolitan 
area divided by the total number 
of square miles in a state 
Ratio  
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Exhibit B, cont’d. 
 
 
Percentage of State Spending 
Devoted to Health Care 
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Total amount of state general 
revenue spent on health care-
related items divided by total 
state revenue spent for a given 
year. 
Ratio 
Mortality Per Capita U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Total number of deaths in a 
state divided by the population 
of a state for a given year. 
Ratio 
Gross State Product Per Capita U.S. Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Total value of goods and 
services produced in a state 
divided by the population of 
the state for a given year. 
Ratio 
Emergency Outpatients 
Treated Per Capita 
American Hospital Association 
Hospital Statistics 
Total number of outpatients 
treated in a state’s hospital 
emergency rooms divided by a 
state’s population for a given 
year. 
Ratio 
Expenditures Per Patient American Hospital Association 
Hospital Statistics 
Total amount spent on the 
treatment of patients in 
hospitals divided by the 
number of patients treated in 
hospitals in the state for a 
given year. 
Ratio 
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Exhibit C 
 
Test for Outliers/Heteroskedasticity in Study of the Effectiveness of 
Market-based Health Insurance Reforms 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of SpendLag 
 
         chi2(1)      =    32.08 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
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Exhibit D  
 
Tests for Normality and Linearity in Study of Effectiveness of 
 
Market-based Health Insurance Programs 
 
 
   Test for Normality of Residuals 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
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.
1
.
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.
2
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y
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Kernel density estimate
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Exhibit E 
 
Test for Linearity 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit E, cont’d. 
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Exhibit E, cont’d. 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit E, cont’d. 
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Exhibit E, cont’d. 
 
 
 
Exhibit E, cont’d. 
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Exhibit E, cont’d. 
 
 
 
Exhibit E, cont’d. 
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Exhibit E, cont’d. 
 
 
 
Exhibit E, cont’d. 
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Exhibit E, cont’d. 
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Exhibit F             
 
Test for Autocorrelation in the Study of the Effectiveness of 
 
Market-based Health Insurance Programs 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      49) =      1.821 
           Prob > F =      0.1834 
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Exhibit G  
Test of Correlations for the Study of the Effectiveness of Market-based 
Health Insurance Programs 
 Market-
based 
Programs 
Mortality State 
Spending 
Poverty Unemployment Uninsured 
Market-based 
Programs 
1.00      
Mortality -0.13 1.00     
State Spending 0.14 0.15 1.00    
Poverty 0.28 0.26 0.42 1.00   
Unemployment 0.16 -0.10 0.17 0.38 1.00  
Uninsured 0.31 -0.12 0.29 0.63 0.45 1.00 
Emergency 
Patients 
-0.20 0.59 0.23 0.30 0.15 -0.03 
M1115 0.004 -0.02 -0.17 -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 
Institutional 
Ideology 
-0.20 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 
Expenditures 
Per Patient 
-0.064 0.47 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.34 
Gross State 
Product 
0.11 -0.09 0.12 0.10 0.23 0.25 
Unionization -0.15 -0.11 -0.20 -0.31 0.11 -0.29 
State 
Employees Per 
Capita 
-0.03 -0.35 -0.03 0.005 0.06 -0.06 
SCHIP 0.19 0.006 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Beds per 
Capita 
-0.06 0.53 0.08 0.24 -0.20 -0.16 
Metropolitan -0.05 -0.10 0.02 -0.24 0.09 0.03 
High-Risk 
Health 
Insurance 
Index 
------------ -0.07 0.26 0.08 0.02 0.04 
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Exhibit G, cont’d. 
 
 Emergency  
Patients 
M1115 Institutional 
Ideology 
Expenditures 
Per Patient 
Gross State 
Product 
Unionization 
Market-based 
Programs 
      
Mortality       
State Spending       
Poverty       
Unemployment       
Uninsured       
Emergency 
Patients 
1.00      
M1115 -0.05 1.00     
Institutional 
Ideology 
0.15 0.36 1.00    
Expenditures 
Per Patient 
0.39 0.12 0.11 1.00   
Gross State 
Product 
-0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.20 1.00  
Unionization -0.13 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.22 1.00 
State 
Employees Per 
Capita 
-0.19 0.18 0.14 -0.14 -0.48 0.09 
SCHIP 0.003 -0.03 0.010 0.23 0.07 -0.18 
Beds per 
Capita 
0.26 -0.18 -0.28 0.36 -0.19 -0.15 
Metropolitan -0.14 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.56 0.29 
High-Risk 
Health 
Insurance 
Index 
-0.14 -0.08 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.04 
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Exhibit G, cont’d. 
 
 State 
Employment 
per Capita 
SCHIP Beds per 
Capita 
Metropolitan High-Risk 
Health 
Insurance 
Index 
Market-based 
Programs 
     
Mortality      
State Spending      
Poverty      
Unemployment      
Uninsured      
Emergency 
Patients 
     
M1115      
Institutional 
Ideology 
     
Expenditures 
Per Patient 
     
Gross State 
Product 
     
Unionization      
State 
Employees Per 
Capita 
1.00     
SCHIP -0.04 1.00    
Beds per 
Capita 
0.001 -0.15 1.00   
Metropolitan -0.35 0.02 -0.53 1.00  
High-Risk 
Health 
Insurance 
Index 
0.13 -0.03 -0.20 -0.28 1.00 
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Exhibit H 
Bivariate Regressions to Test for Correlations of Variables in the 
Effectiveness Study with High Bivariate Correlations 
Dependent 
Variables 
Poverty Uninsured Beds per 
Capita 
Mortality 
Poverty ----------------- Prob>F=.000; 
R-sq=0.40 
Prob>F=0.000 
R-sq=0.03 
Prob>F=0.000 
R-sq=0.07 
Uninsured Prob>F=0.000 
R-sq=0.40 
---------------- Prob>F=0.000 
R-sq=0.02 
Prob>F=0.01 
R-sq=0.01 
Beds per 
Capita 
Prob>F=0.002 
R-sq=0.02 
Prob>F=0.000 
R-sq=0.05 
----------------- Prob>F=0.10 
Mortality Prob>F=0.000 
R-sq=0.07 
Prob>F=0.004 
R-sq=0.02 
Prob>F=0.081 
R sq=0.009 
---------------- 
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Exhibit I  
Variables, Sources, Coding and Level of Measurement for the 
Independent Variables in the Study of the Adoption of State 
Market-based Health Insurance Programs 
Covariates Source Description Level of 
Measurement 
Majority 
Control of the 
Legislature 
U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage difference between the 
majority party in the state legislature and 
the minority party in the state legislature. 
Interval 
Democratic 
Control  
of the 
Legislature 
U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage of seats in the state 
legislature held by Democrats. 
Interval  
Citizen 
Ideology 
Web Site of Dr. 
Richard Fording, 
University of 
Kentucky  
Index of the liberalism of the general 
population of a state 
(0=highly conservative; 100=highly 
liberal) 
Interval  
Percentage of 
Small 
Businesses 
Offering 
Insurance 
Medical 
Expenditures 
Panel Survey  
(multiple years) 
Percentage of the total small businesses 
(less than 50 employees) that provide 
insurance coverage to their employees.  
Ratio 
Percentage of 
Minorities in 
the State 
U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage of the total citizens in a state 
that are non-white. 
Ratio 
Percentage of 
a State’s 
Population that 
are Members 
of Unions 
U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Percentage of a state’s population that 
belong to labor unions.  
Ratio 
Southern 
States 
U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical 
Abstract 
Dummy variable indicating whether a 
state is Southern or non-Southern state. 
Ordinal  
(dummy 
variable) 
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Exhibit J  
Correlation between Rank of Duration and Schoenfeld Residuals 
 (Test of Proportionality Assumption) 
 
 
Covariate Southern 
States 
Minority 
Population 
Small 
Business 
Union 
Population 
Citizen 
Ideology 
Democratic 
Control 
Majority 
Control 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.076 .275 -.074 -.059 -.067 .318 .033 
Sig. .358 .092 .362 .389 .375 .061 .437 
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Exhibit K  
Bivariate Correlations Between Covariates in the 
Cox Regression Model of Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Southern 
States 
Minority 
Population 
Small 
Business 
Union 
Population 
Citizen 
Ideology 
Democratic 
Control 
Majority 
Control 
Southern States 1 (.000) .172 (.002) -.471 
(.000) 
-.190 
(.001) 
-.372 (.000) .591  
(.000) 
.401 
(.000) 
Minority 
Population 
.172 
(.002) 
1 (.000) -.376 
(.000) 
-.131 
(.013) 
-.361 (.000) .264 (.000) -.045 
(.221) 
Small Business -.471 
(.000) 
-.376 (.000) 1 (.000) .281 
(.000) 
.336 (.000) -.365 (.000) -.376 
(.000) 
Union 
Population 
-.190 
(.001) 
-.131 (.013) .281 
(.000) 
1 (.000) .562 (.000) .174 (.000) -.131 
(.013) 
Citizen 
Ideology 
-.372 
(.000) 
-.361 (.000) .336 
(.000) 
.562 
(.000) 
1 (.000) .077 (.094) -.361 
(.000) 
Democratic 
Control 
.591 
(.000) 
.264 (.000) -.365 
(.000) 
.174 
(.000) 
.077(.094) 1 (.000) .294 
(.000) 
Majority 
Control  
.401 
(.000) 
-.045 (.221) -.376 
(.000) 
-.131 
(.013) 
-.361 (.000) .294 (.000) 1 (.000) 
 150 
 
Exhibit L  
Bivariate Regression Results for the Relationships Between Covariates in 
in the Cox Regression Model of Adoption 
 (Adjusted R-Squares and Significance) 
 
 
 
 
Southern 
States 
Minority 
Population 
Small 
Business 
Union 
Population 
Citizen 
Ideology 
Democratic 
Control 
Majority 
Control 
Southern 
States 
 .026 
(.003) 
.219 
(.000) 
.033 (.001) .135 
(.000) 
.347 
(.000) 
.158 (.000) 
Minority 
Population 
.026 
(.003) 
 .02 
(.009) 
.017 (.014) .005 
(.116) 
.066 
(.000) 
-.001 (.442) 
Small 
Business 
.219 
(.000) 
.02 (.009)  .076 (.000) .11 
(.000) 
.13 (.000) .138 (.000) 
Union 
Population 
.033 
(.001) 
.017 
(.014) 
.076 
(.000) 
 .314 
(.000) 
.027 
(.003) 
.014 (.025) 
Citizen 
Ideology 
.135 
(.000) 
.005 
(.116) 
.11 
(.000) 
.314 (.000)  .003 
(.118) 
.128 (.000) 
Democratic 
Control 
.347 
(.000) 
.066 
(.000) 
.13 
(.000) 
.027 (.003) .003 
(.118) 
 .083 (.000) 
Majority 
Control 
.158 
(.000) 
-
.001(.442) 
.138 
(.000) 
.014 (.025) .128 
(.000) 
.083 
(.000) 
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